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ABSTRACT
LOCATING THE SOURCE OF APPROACH/AVOIDANCE EFFECTS ON
NATURAL LANGUAGE CATEGORY DECISIONS
SEPTEMBER 2012
MATTHEW ZIVOT, B.A., THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
PH.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Andrew Cohen
In this dissertation, two exemplar-based models of categorization, the General
Context Model (GCM) and the Exemplar Based Random Walk model (EBRW), were
used to describe between-group categorization differences in artificial and natural
language categories. Prior research has shown that political Conservatives in avoidance
mode are more exclusive categorizers of natural language category members than
Conservatives in approach mode, but this effect was absent for Liberals (Rock &
Janoff-Bulman, 2010). In Experiment 1, experimenter-generated stimuli were used to
show that the EBRW could account for between-group differences in categorization
decisions. In Experiment 2, the data collected by Rock and Janoff-Bulman were used
to develop techniques allowing the GCM to account for between-group differences in
natural language categorization decisions. Experiment 3 extends these methods to allow
the EBRW to account for between-group differences in natural language categorization
decisions. Across these experiments, the models identify between-group differences in
determining similarity, bias to give an “in-the-category” decision, and the amount of
information required to make a categorization decision. Techniques for modeling natural
language categorization decisions are discussed
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Sometimes, the Supreme Court must step in to make a categorization decision
for a nation torn apart. In 1893 it officially decided that tomatoes are Vegetables and not
Fruit in Nix v. Hedden (1893). In the Court’s decision the common use of tomatoes—as
an ingredient in salads and main dishes rather than desserts—is taken as evidence that
tomatoes are Vegetables. This decision, however, has not ended the debate. Just recently
Ohio named the tomato its State Fruit. The Supreme Court may have to revisit this issue
in the near future.
Why do these debates continue? What is different about people who categorize
tomatoes as fruits and those who categorize them as vegetables? Researchers have
identified many causes of between-group differences in categorization decisions,
including goals (e.g., Barsalou, 1983), mood (e.g., Isen & Daubman, 1984), background
knowledge (e.g., Lin & Murphy, 1997), and the interaction of political identity and being
in approach or avoidance mode (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). Researchers are still
uncertain, however, which step or steps in the categorization process are influenced by
these contextual factors.
This dissertation will use models of categorization to account for between-group
differences in categorization observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman. They found that
when Conservative participants were placed into avoidance mode—a state in which
people focus on preventing negative outcomes—they became more exclusive categorizers
than when Conservative participants were placed into approach mode—a state in which
people focus on bringing about positive outcomes. That is, Conservatives in avoidance
mode required items to be highly typical of their category before they made an “In-thecategory” judgment. Liberals, however, were found to be equally inclusive regardless of
whether they were in approach or avoidance mode.
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In order to locate the source of between-group differences in categorization
decisions, one must first identify the stages of categorization. For millennia,
categorization was considered to be a rule-defined process in which people determined
whether a to-be-categorized item met all the criteria set forth by the rules that govern
a category (Murphy, 2002). For example, a tomato is a fruit if it has seeds within a
fleshy covering. Theoretical work by Wittgenstein (1953) and empirical studies by
Rosch and Mervis (1975) have provided evidence that categories are not rule-based but
instead are family-resemblance based. For example, a tomato has uses in common with
many vegetables and therefore should be grouped with the items to which it is most
similar. According to this view, the process of categorization depends on determining
the dimensions along which category members are similar and how this similarity is
translated into category membership (Medin & Schaffer, 1978).
Many theories of categorization focus on how the features of a to-be-categorized
item impact a categorization decision (for a critique, see Murphy & Medin, 1985).
As discussed, though, factors other than the item itself have been shown to influence
category related decisions. For the purposes of this dissertation, these factors will be
referred to as context.
Researchers who have investigated components of the categorization process
that are affected by context have focused on the selection of pertinent dimensions (e.g.,
Kelemen & Bloom, 1994; Lin & Murphy, 1997). (For example, attending to the color
of a person’s clothing may be essential for categorizing friends versus foes during a
pick-up basketball game but bears little weight while ice skating.) Researchers have
specifically designed their experiments to identify differences in this component of
categorization. While determining how attention is distributed across dimensions is an
important component of the categorization process, it is neither the only component of
the categorization process nor the only one in which context has an effect. For instance,
researchers have found that approach and avoidance mode not only impacts how attention
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is distributed across dimensions (Förster, Friedman, Özelsel, & Denzler, 2006; P. A.
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), but also whether commonalities or differences are given
preference for making similarity judgments (Förster, 2009) and how decision boundaries
are established (Markman, Baldwin, & Maddox, 2005). If context can affect components
of categorization other than the selection of pertinent dimensions, more sensitive
experimental methods will be required to capture these effects.
Process models of categorization like SUSTAIN (Love, Medin, & Gureckis,
2004) and the General Context Model (Nosofsky, 1984; Nosofsky, 1986) represent
multiple components of the categorization process. Such models can be used to identify
any component in which context creates between-group categorization differences so
long as the model has a parameter to describe that component. In order to describe
between-group differences, a model must be selected that has parameters for components
of categorization that are affected by context.
Exemplar models, such as the General Context Model and the Exemplar Based
Random Walk (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997), are good candidates for identifying the
components of the categorization process that are affected by context. An exemplarbased model represents a category with a set of previously seen items whose category
membership is known (i.e., exemplars). In these models a to-be-categorized item is
compared to exemplars and categorized based on the category membership of the
exemplars to which it is most similar. A prototype-based model represents a category with
an abstraction of previously seen items whose category membership is known (Hampton,
1993). Exemplar-based models may be better able to describe the effects of ephemeral
contexts than prototype-based or rule-based models because information about previously
seen category members is preserved. Furthermore, exemplar models have parameters
that can be matched with cognitive processes upon which approach and avoidance modes
have an impact.
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The purpose of this dissertation, therefore, is to determine whether the General
Context Model and the Exemplar Based Random Walk can identify the source of
between-group differences in categorization decisions reported by Rock and JanoffBulman (2010). To do so requires:
1. Using the EBRW to examine between-group differences in categorizing
artificial stimuli;
2. Extending the GCM to account for between-group differences in natural
language categorization; and finally,
3. Extending the EBRW to account for between-group differences in natural
language categorization.

4

Chapter 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
The Process of Categorization
If a category can be defined with a set of necessary and sufficient rules, then
categorization is a simple task. When an item fulfils those rules, it is a member of the
category; when it does not, it is not. Socrates is looking for just such a set of rules on the
way to his trial when he says, “I did not bid you to tell me one or two of the many pious
actions, but the form itself that makes all pious actions pious” (Plato, 1975). Philosophers
spent millennia trying to define necessary and sufficient rules for categories, but could
only do so for the most artificial of categories like the mathematical category: prime
numbers.
In the middle of the twentieth century, Wittgenstein (1953) concluded that
categories are not based on necessary and sufficient rules, but are based on family
resemblance. He writes that family resemblances are “a complicated network of
similarities overlapping and crisscrossing.” For example, as a Dead Head you might
listen to jam music, wear tie-dye, go on tour with a band, and sell plates of rice and beans
in a parking lot, but you may not have to do all of these things to be a Dead Head.
If categories are based on family resemblance, membership can be a continuous
measure rather than an all-or-nothing state. Evidence for this continuum has come from
different measurements. Rosch (1975) showed that different people tended to agree on
how typical an item was of a given category. Rips, Shoben, and Smith (1973) showed
that an item’s typicality as a member of a given category predicts the speed with which a
person can make a categorization decision about that item. McCloskey and Glucksberg
(1978) showed that an item’s typicality as a member of a given category predicts the &
Blok, 2005) or average (Hampton, 1993) representations of categories. For example, the
prototypical representation of Bird might have all of the features associated with birds,
such as flying, having feathers, and living in trees. It also would lack all of the features
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that are associated with other categories, such as swimming, having scales, or nesting on
the ground. According to proponents of exemplars, a to-be-categorized item is compared
to a set of previously seen items that represent a category (Medin & Schaffer, 1978). For
example, an item seen moving across the sky might be compared to specific birds, planes,
and super-heroes that you have previously seen.
The Effect of Context on Categorization
Although category membership is on a continuum, there is no reason for category
decisions to be inconsistent over time (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978) unless the
context within which a category decision is made matters. An ephemeral context like
a temporary goal or stance may account for some of the intrapersonal variability in
categorization decisions observed by McCloskey and Glucksberg. Barsalou (1983)
showed that participants provided with a goal that two items—normally considered
dissimilar—can both accomplish were more likely to rate those items as similar. For
example, when participants were given the goal of getting a birthday gift, they rated CDs
and necklaces as more similar than participants who were not given a goal. Lombrozo
(2009) showed that participants primed to take a teleological stance (focusing on ends)
were more likely to say that items were members of a given category if those items had
the same parts as known category members. Participants primed to take a mechanistic
stance (focusing on means) were more likely to say that items were members of a given
category if those items behaved in the same way as known category members. For
example, a teleological stance might make you more likely to accept a person wearing
a suit who listens to the Grateful Dead as a Dead Head, but a mechanistic stance might
favor you towards a person wearing tie-die who does not listen to the Grateful Dead.
An ephemeral context like a temporary mood or mode may account for
intrapersonal variability in categorization decisions. Ell, Cosley, and McCoy (2011)
showed that participants under stress were able to identify members of a learned category
more accurately than participants who were not under stress. Isen and Daubman (1984)
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showed that participants who were given a free gift or shown a funny movie were more
willing to include atypical category members in a given category (e.g., olives in Fruit)
than those who did not receive a free gift or who saw a boring movie. Using a similar
categorization task, Price and Harmon-Jones (2010) showed that mode (approach
vs. avoidance) may alter the inclusiveness of categorizers who are in a good mood.
Participants were asked to smile, emulating a positive mood, and then to lean forward, sit
upright, or recline, representing a range from high to low approach mode. Participants in
the low-approach mode position (i.e., recliners) were more inclusive when categorizing
atypical items than participants in the high-approach mode position (i.e., leaners).
Context like accessories that are incidental to a to-be-categorized item—ephemera
that could change while the to-be-categorized item itself does not—may account for some
of the intrapersonal variability in categorization decisions. Macrae, Bodenhausen, and
Milne (1995) showed that participants shown a video of an Asian woman eating with
chopsticks were more likely to categorize her as Asian while participants shown video of
the same woman applying make-up were more likely to categorize her as a Woman.
Finally, categories can be imagined as fitting into a taxonomy, with more abstract
superordinate labels and less abstract subordinate labels. For instance, a sparrow is a
Bird, which is an Animal. Ephemeral contexts may account for some of the intrapersonal
variability in categorization decisions by changing the way that people use this taxonomy
when categorizing. Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson, and Boyes-Braem (1976) and Collins
and Quillian (1969) showed that categories often display what is termed a “basic
level effect.” Participants in both studies displayed a preference for a certain level of
abstractness when categorizing. For example, an item was categorized as a Chair first
and faster than as Furniture (superordinate) or as an Easy Chair (subordinate). Ephemeral
context like the scene that surrounds a to-be-categorized item can diminish or erase
the basic level effect (Murphy & Wisniewski, 1989). For example, an object might be
categorized as a Settee when it is selected from a showroom but may be categorized as a
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Couch when it is offered as a seat to a friend. In part, this is due to the other objects from
which the to-be-categorized item needs to be distinguished.
Rosch (1975) showed that when participants were primed with a superordinate
category label, they read words representing typical members of that category faster and
words representing atypical members of that category slower than when they were not
primed with a superordinate category label. Temporarily changing the context in which
a superordinate category label is seen changes the facility with which participants read
words representing typical and atypical members of that category (Roth & Shoben,
1983). For example, the word “goat” was read faster than the word “horse” following a
sentence about “milking the animal” even though horses are more typical members of the
category Animal than goats.
Some contexts, like background knowledge, are more persistent and may account
for interpersonal differences in categorization decisions. Tanaka and Taylor (1991)
showed that the extent of background knowledge participants had about an item changed
the basic taxonomic level at which that item was categorized. Experts identified items at a
more subordinate basic level than novices. For example, a bird expert who spots a scarlet
tanager is likely to categorize it as a Tanager, while a non-birder is likely to categorize it
as a Bird1. Yamauchi and Yu (2008) showed that adding background knowledge changed
the types of inferences participants made about the members of a category. When
participants were told that an item’s label reflected category membership they inferred
that the item shared features of prototypical category members. When they were told that
an item’s label reflected the place where it lived or the type of food it ate they inferred
that the item shared features of the most similar exemplar that they had seen.
Persistent contexts like group identity may also affect categorization decisions.
Medin, Cox, and Ross (2006) showed that sport and subsistence fishermen in the same
region rate the typicality of local fishes differently even though both groups were highly
1 Note: This is taxonomically equivalent to categorizing squirrels, dogs, and humans as
Mammals, so perhaps—not surprisingly—we are all mammal experts.
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familiar with these fish. Lynch, Coley, and Medin (2000) showed that tree taxonomists
and horticulturalists both used goals for determining tree typicality, but differences in
their goals led them to rate the typicality of trees differently. Ratneshwar, Barsalou,
Pechmann, and Moore (2001) showed that participants identified as healthy eaters and
participants who were not identified as healthy eaters rated the similarity of candy bars
and granola bars differently when they were asked to consider foods one might eat while
driving. Lombrozo (2009) showed that participants who naturally take a teleological
stance toward the world were likely to include items with similar purposes in the same
category, while participants who naturally take a mechanistic stance toward the world
were more likely to include items with similar constructions in the same category. Rock
and Janoff-Bulman (2010) showed that participants who self-identified as politically
conservative were more likely to exclude items of moderate typicality from a given
category when those participants were put in avoidance mode. For example, they were
less likely to say that a bookcase is Furniture or that a yacht is a Vehicle. Participants
who self-identified as political liberals were not more likely to exclude items of moderate
typicality from a given category when those participants were put in avoidance mode.
Finally, persistent context like the relationships between category members can
affect categorization decisions. Categories can be more or less coherent based on how
well they “go together in light of prior theoretical, causal, and teleological knowledge”
(Patalano, Chin-Parker, & Ross, 2006). Patalano, Wengrovitz, and Sharpes (2009) and
Patalano, Chin-Parker, and Ross (2006) showed that people are more likely to make
inferences based on an item’s membership in a more coherent category than that item’s
membership in a less coherent category. Participants were more likely to make inferences
about feminist waiters based on their membership in the category Feminists than in their
membership in the category Waiters.
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Identifying the Effect of Context on Attention to Dimensions
Experimenters that attempt to identify specific components of the categorization
process that are affected by context often use artificial stimuli or artificial categories.
These stimuli have high internal validity (but low ecological validity) because
experimenters create them to operationalize the specific theories about categorization
that they are investigating. For example, Yamauchi and Yu (2008) created “bug” stimuli
with five different dimensions (antennae shape, head shape, number of legs, thorax
markings, tail shape), each of which had two feature values. The category label assigned
to each variation of these stimuli was determined based on family resemblance theories
of category structure. These clearly delineated dimensions with easily distinguishable
features are designed allow researchers to identify how these dimensions are used for the
purpose of categorization.
For example, Kelemen and Bloom (1994) designed stimuli that were circles of
different colors and sizes. When participants were told that they were categorizing Tiny
Machines they categorized primarily along the dimension of size; when participants
were told that they were categorizing Microscopic Animals they categorized primarily
along the dimension of color. Background knowledge about Animals and Machines is
likely to have changed the dimensions that participants used when making categorization
decisions.
A series of studies using the novel categories of Arctic Vehicles and Jungle
Vehicles have shown that background knowledge affects the selection of pertinent
dimensions during categorization decisions (Kaplan & Murphy, 1999; Kaplan & Murphy,
2000; Murphy & Allopenna, 1994; Spalding & Murphy, 1999). When making decisions
about novel categories, background knowledge made it easier for participants to build
multi-dimensional family resemblance categories rather than one-dimensional rulebased categories (Kaplan & Murphy, 1999). It also made it easier for participants to
learn categories that require attention across multiple dimensions (Kaplan & Murphy,
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2000; Murphy & Allopenna, 1994) without reducing their sensitivity to feature frequency
(Spalding & Murphy, 1999). In all of these studies, participants used more of the
dimensions of the vehicles for their categorization decisions than when the dimensions
did not allow them to apply their background knowledge.
Sometimes researchers create both artificial stimuli and artificial categories to
pinpoint a step in the categorization process that they think context affects. For example,
Lin and Murphy (1997) created an artificial category Tuk and artificial stimuli with four
dimensions (a loop, a cone, a tube, and a string), each of which could have a value of
present or absent. One group of participants learned that a Tuk was an animal catching
device; a second group of participants learned that a Tuk was a pesticide spreading
device. Participants with different background knowledge paid attention to different
dimensions when making categorization decisions about which artificial stimuli were in
the artificial category Tuk and which were not.
Effects of Approach/Avoidance Mode on Cognition
The purpose of this dissertation is to account for the between-group differences
in categorization decisions identified by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Namely, that
Conservatives were more likely to exclude items of moderate typicality from a given
category when they were put in avoidance mode. Research on approach and avoidance
modes and cognition indicate several potential sources of this effect: spreading attention
(Friedman & Förster, 2005; Förster et al., 2006; P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; P.
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Koch, Holland, Hengstler, & van Knippenberg, 2009),
attention to similarities as opposed to dissimilarities (Förster, 2009), and changing
decision criteria (Markman et al., 2005). In each of the studies discussed in the previous
section, researchers have investigated the effect of context on one component of the
categorization process: the selection of pertinent dimensions. The current section will
show that accounting for the between-group differences in categorization by people
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in approach and avoidance mode will require a method sensitive to differences in
components other than the selection of pertinent dimensions.
Approach and avoidance mode may impact the spread of attention though the
direction of its effect is unclear. Participants have a narrow spread of attention when
they focus on component elements (i.e., the trees); they have a broad spread of attention
when they focus on composite elements (i.e., the forest). Förster et al. (2006) primed
participants for approach or avoidance and then had them respond to composite letters
that were comprised of smaller component letters (called Navon letters). They found that
participants in the approach condition were faster to respond to the composite letters and
participants in the avoidance condition were faster to respond to the component letters.
This indicates that participants in the approach condition were spreading their attention
more broadly to see the larger picture and participants in the avoidance condition were
narrowing their attention to see the details.
Approach and avoidance mode may interact with emotion to affect the spread of
attention. In a study of mode and positive affect (P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008),
participants were primed for either low-approach mode or high approach mode and then
asked to choose the best pair from a group that matched either on composite shape or
component parts. Gable and Harmon-Jones found that participants in the low approach
condition selected shapes with composite similarity more often than participants in the
high-approach condition. In a similar study, Gable and Harmon-Jones (2010) primed
participants with low levels of avoidance or high levels of avoidance and asked them to
respond to Navon letters. They found that participants in the low avoidance condition
were faster to identify composite letters than component letters, while participants in the
high avoidance condition were faster to identify component letters than composite letters.
In contrast to the findings of Förster et al. (2006), these studies indicate that both high
avoidance and high approach modes lead to a narrower distribution of attention relative
to low avoidance or low approach modes.
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The Stroop task is another measure that approach and avoidance modes impact,
and again the direction of that impact is unclear. Friedman and Förster (2005) found
that participants primed with approach mode were faster to respond to incompatible
color trials than participants primed with avoidance mode. In a contrasting study using
embodied cognition techniques, Koch, Holland, Hengstler and van Knippenberg (2009)
found that when participants were primed with avoidance mode, they were faster on the
incompatible color trials than when they were primed with approach mode. Not only do
these results contradict each other, but the authors’ interpretation of them may conflict
as well. Koch et al. take their results as evidence that, “avoidance cues facilitate the
recruitment of cognitive control.” Friedman and Förster, however, take their results to
mean that approach mode serves to, “enhance attentional flexibility.”
In the end, what is being “cognitively controlled” is which cues to attend to and
which to ignore, so all of these studies imply that approach and avoidance modes impact
the distribution of attention. This explanation holds regardless of whether approach mode
broadens attention, avoidance mode broadens attention, or they both decrease it. The
effect still lies at the distribution of attention. Therefore, any method used to identify
between-group differences in categorization performance due to approach and avoidance
mode should have a way of measuring the distribution of attention.
Recent research has reinterpreted the meaning of the broad versus narrow
spreading of attention as attending to similarities as opposed to dissimilarities. Förster
(2009) found that, when asked to compare two items, participants who were primed with
broad attention listed more similarities than dissimilarities while participants primed with
narrow attention listed more dissimilarities than similarities. This implies that approach
and avoidance modes change the way that people weight similarity, either focusing
participants on what makes items more similar to each other or more dissimilar to each
other. Therefore, any method used to identify the source of the differences between
modes should be able to account for differences in similarity weighting.
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Research on the interaction between approach and avoidance mode and category
structure during a category learning task indicates that mode can influence a decision
criterion Markman, Baldwin and Maddox (Markman et al., 2005) found that when
participants primed with approach mode learned a one-dimensional category with an
approach feedback structure, they used a categorization criterion that optimized reward
rather than performance. Participants primed with approach mode learning a onedimensional category with an avoidance feedback structure used a criterion to optimize
performance rather than reward. Conversely, participants primed with avoidance mode
used a criterion to optimize reward with an avoidance feedback structure but optimized
performance with an approach feedback structure. In this one-dimensional category
structure, spread of attention across dimensions could not be a factor. This finding implies
that a method used to identify between-group differences due to approach and avoidance
modes should be able to identify changes in decision boundary as well.
Finally, Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) found that conservatives in avoidance
mode were less likely to include moderately typical items in a category, while Price
and Harmon-Jones (2010) found that participants in avoidance were more likely to
include highly atypical items in a category. This difference in results may be explained
by changes in consistency of categorization decisions. If avoidance mode induces
probability matching, categorizers in avoidance mode would make “in-the-category”
decisions in proportion to their perceived probability that the to-be-categorized item is a
category member, as opposed to consistently giving the most likely response. Practically
speaking, this behavior would increase the inclusion of moderately atypical items while
depressing the inclusion of moderately typical items. Any method used to identify the
source of approach/avoidance differences on categorization should include a way to
measure the consistency of responding. Research by Janoff-Bulman, Sheikh and Baldacci
(2008) indicates that political conservatism tend toward avoidance mode while political
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liberalism tend toward approach mode, so a method that can capture the effects of
approach/avoidance should be able to capture the effects of political identity as well.
Modeling the Categorization Process
The previous section shows that approach and avoidance modes affect the
spread of attention across dimensions, whether commonalities or dissimilarities are
attended to and how decision criteria are established. It is clear that a method for
locating the components in the categorization process affected by approach/avoidance
will need to capture effects other than how attention is distributed across dimensions. A
promising method for identifying the effects of approach/avoidance is to use models of
categorization. Process models formalize the components of the categorization process,
specifying parameters that describe each component (Kruschke, 2008). Differences
in these parameters can reflect between-group differences in specific components of
categorization.
When formalizing the categorization process, models make assumptions about
whether categories are represented with prototypes or exemplars. They also break up
the categorization process into different components. The assumptions that a model
makes about the process of categorization affects its ability to capture the between-group
differences caused by approach and avoidance mode. Some models of categorization,
such as ATRIUM (Erickson & Kruschke, 1998) and ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) have
been shown to perform well at capturing categorization decisions. Since they are
implemented as connectionist models that slowly learn categories over time, however,
they are not well suited to capturing the spontaneous changes in categorization behavior
observed in Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Other models, such as the Rational
Model (Anderson, 1991) use a Bayesian analysis to describe optimal categorization
performance. This would not be well suited to indentifying the reason for between-group
differences, since there can be only one optimal categorization strategy. This section
will survey some of the prominent models of categorization that either explicitly address
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between-group differences or have been designed in a way to capture the impacts of
approach and avoidance mode.
Knowledge Resonance
The Knowledge Resonance Model is a connectionist prototype model that has
the effect of background knowledge built in (Rehder & Murphy, 2003). It represents a
to-be-categorized item’s features as input nodes and category labels as output nodes.
For example, a connectionist model of Dead Head categorization could have an input
node for tie-die shirts. When this input node is activated in the presence of a tie-die shirt,
it excites the output node of Dead Head. The Knowledge Resonance Model (KRES)
is constructed to represent the kind of association between features that background
knowledge brings to the categorization process (e.g., Hoffman, Harris, & Murphy, 2008;
Murphy & Allopenna, 1994). For example, knowing that a person wears tie-die magnifies
the effect of knowing that they tour with a band when exciting the Dead Head category
label. Furthermore, it mutes the potential activation of contrasting features that could
inhibit the activation of the Dead Head category label, such as living in a Manhattan
penthouse. KRES represents these relations with excitatory connections between features
that are associated with each other and inhibitory connections between features that
associated with a contrasting category.
KRES is unsatisfactory for capturing the effects of approach and avoidance on
categorization because the effects of context are built into the model. KRES represents
between-group differences as the excitatory and inhibitory associations between features.
These relations are not flexible and cannot reflect the ephemeral changes that occur when
a person changes goals, moods or modes. Furthermore, KRES does not break down
categorization in a way that provides analogs with the aspects of cognition that approach
and avoidance mode have been shown to impact, such as attending to similarities versus
dissimilarities and changing decision boundaries. All effects are all conflated in the
weights between nodes.
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Baywatch
A second model that captures the effect of background knowledge is called
Baywatch (Heit, Briggs, & Bott, 2004). It is also a connectionist prototype model in
which input feature nodes get associated with output category labels. The model is
modified so that features also can get associated with latent concepts, which themselves
get associated with category labels. For instance, if you did not know the concept of
Parrot Heads, you would be unlikely to apply that category label to people wearing
flip-flops, drinking margaritas and following Jimmy Buffet. Once you realize that Parrot
Heads are similar in concept to Dead Heads, wearing flip-flops and drinking margaritas
gets associated with concept of Dead Head. The latent concept of Dead Head then gets
associated with the category label Parrot Head, providing extra activation between Parrot
Head input nodes and the Parrot Head category label.
While Baywatch may partially represent the impact that background knowledge
has on categorization decisions, it cannot be extended to account for the effects of
ephemeral context observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Like KRES, the effect
of background knowledge is built into the model. In Baywatch this effect is included as
the presence of latent concepts, preventing this model from capturing ephemeral context
effects on categorization. Also like KRES, all effects in Baywatch are captured in the
weights between input nodes, latent concepts, and output nodes. This makes Baywatch
unable to identify components of the categorization process that are affected by approach/
avoidance mode.
General Recognition Theory
General Recognition Theory is a modern version of rule-based categorization
theories (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Maddox & Ashby, 1993). For instance, imagine a
group of Dead Heads arguing about how to determine category membership. One is
only willing to include people who have seen a minimum number of shows. Another
is only willing to include people who have accumulated a minimum number of taped
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concerts. A third allows a more generous combination of the two – if you have seen
some shows and possess some taped concerts, you are categorized as a Dead Head. The
General Recognition Theory (GRT) represents the categorization process by fitting a
decision boundary that separates
members of different categories.
For the first categorizer, it will
locate a linear boundary along
the “shows-attended” dimension,
for the second categorizer it will
locate a linear boundary along the
“taped-concerts” dimension, and for
the third categorizer it will find a
combination of both dimensions that
best accounts for their categorization

Figure 1: Example of GRT category boundaries

decisions. Figure 1 shows a
graphical representation of these
boundaries.
The GRT does a good job of capturing the spread of attention across dimensions.
It could capture the effects of approach and avoidance observed by Forster et al. (2006)
and Gable and Harmon-Jones (2008). Narrowed attention could be represented by a
one-dimensional rule while broad attention could be represented by a combination
across multiple dimensions. The GRT, however, would not be able to capture potential
differences in whether commonalities or dissimilarities are given preference since it has
no way of describing dimensions in this fashion. The GRT also has no way to determine
if categorization decisions have become more or less consistent, since there are no
regions of uncertainty around the decision boundary. It predicts that every item on a given
side of the boundary will be included or excluded with equal probability.
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The GRT has been used to identify between-group differences in categorization.
Ell et al. (2011) had participants learn to categorize a two-dimensional stimulus in a
way that required attending to both dimensions after they had been placed in a stressful
situation. The researchers used the GRT to determine that a participant’s perception of
threat was associated with their using an appropriate strategy of combining information
across dimensions (rather than attending to only one dimension or just guessing). Again,
the GRT does not test for any differences other than attention to dimensions, and any
other potential differences in the categorization process were undetected.
SUSTAIN
SUSTAIN is a connectionist prototype model that accounts for both how new
items are categorized and how new categories are learned (Love et al., 2004). Instead
of a typical prototype model with just one prototype for each category (Hampton,
1993), categories in SUSTAIN are represented by a set of prototypes called subgroups.
Subgroups are averages across a subset of previously seen category members, and these
subgroups help to represent categories in which there are disparate clusters of entities.
For example, spoons are usually either small and metal or large and wooden, but not
somewhere in between the two. A prototype model with just one representation of spoons
would have trouble representing this structure, so in SUSTAIN spoons might be best
represented by two clusters. One averages the features of previously seen teaspoons and
soupspoons, and another averages the features of previously seen wooden spoons.
In the categorization process as described by SUSTAIN the similarity between
a to-be-categorized item a subgroups determines the activation of that subgroup.
The subgroup with the most activation determines the outcome of the categorization
decision. In SUSTAIN and other similarity-based models of categorization, similarity is
a mathematical measure of how close the features of a to-be-categorized item are to those
of a given category representation (be it an exemplar or a prototype). For SUSTAIN,
similarity is determined by degree of match between the to-be-categorized item and the
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subgroup’s typical feature values, weighted by how important each dimension is for the
purposes of categorization. When a dimension is unimportant for identifying a subgroup,
any feature value along that dimension adds a little bit to the similarity calculation. For
example, the color of a spoon bears little importance to the small spoon cluster, and
therefore an item of any color will provide a little bit of activation. For a dimension
that is important to category membership, a feature that is located in the correct part
of the dimension space adds a lot to the similarity calculation, while a feature located
in the wrong part of the dimension space does not add anything at all. For example,
having a bowl at its top would provide a lot of activation to both spoon clusters. If a
to-be-categorized item is sufficiently similar to one subgroup, it is assumed to have the
category membership of that group and the item’s features are averaged into the subgroup
representation. If it is not sufficiently similar to any subgroup, a new subgroup gets
created with the new item’s features and category membership.
Like the connectionist prototype models previously discussed, SUSTAIN would
have problems accounting for the effects of approach and avoidance on categorization
observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). First, SUSTAIN would have a hard
time accounting for an ephemeral change in dimension saliency since SUSTAIN is a
connectionist model that learns the importance of a given dimension over time and there
is no mechanism for those values to shift suddenly. This is especially problematic since
all context effects that have so far been located within the categorization process have
been identified as occurring at the level changing attention to dimensions. Second, it does
not have a process for accounting for how similarities or dissimilarities are preferred.
Finally, the process of averaging across items to create subgroups obscures the individual
information of each previously seen item. If attending to similarities suddenly makes a
specific exemplar salient and this impacts categorization decisions, SUSTAIN could only
handle this if it preserved that specific exemplar within its own subgroup. For instance,
imagine being asked if a honey-dipper was a spoon. It is unlike the average representation
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for small spoons, but it may be moderately similar to a previously seen hand-carved
wooden spoon. A categorizer attending to commonalities would likely call this spoon
to mind while a categorizer attending to dissimilarities would not. SUSTAIN would be
unlikely to capture this difference.
GCM
As described in the introduction, the GCM is an exemplar-based model of
category application (Ashby & Maddox, 1993; Nosofsky, 1984; Nosofsky, 1986). To
categorize an item, the GCM calculates that items similarity to all previously seen
exemplars. The GCM predicts that the item has the probability of being placed in a given
category relative its similarity is to exemplars of that category. The GCM has a few
aspects that make it attractive for identifying the between-group differences observed by
Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010): it explicitly weights the impact of each dimension of a
given item on the similarity calculation, and it has a parameter that scales the impact of
moderately similar items.
The GCM has a weight for each dimension that is factored into the categorization
decision. These dimension weights allow a dimension to have more weight in certain
circumstances and less in others. To return to our feuding Dead Heads example,
Categorizer 1 would put all weight on the “shows attended” dimension, Categorizer 2
would put all weight on the “concerts taped” dimension and Categorizer 3 would split
weight between both dimensions. Note that these weights are not an inherent property
of the exemplars but instead they filter the exemplar at the time of the categorization
decision. That is, the dimensions of an exemplar that are important for its category
membership are not fixed. This means that, unlike SUSTAIN, the GCM can account for
the effects of ephemeral contexts like approach and avoidance on the spread of attention
across dimensions (Förster et al., 2006; P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008). A person
could have attended many Grateful Dead concerts and therefore be similar to other Dead
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Heads for Categorizer 1 and also have many concerts on tape and therefore be similar to
other Dead Heads for Categorizer 2.
In addition to dimension weights, the GCM has a similarity scaling parameter
that converts the distance between a to-be-categorized item and an exemplar to similarity.
Similarity decreases exponentially as the distance between that exemplar and that to-becategorized item increases, and the scaling parameter controls the rate of that decrease.
The larger this parameter is, the closer an exemplar needs to be to the to-be-categorized
item before it influences the categorization decision. As will be shown, the distance
metric in the GCM moves an exemplar farther from a to-be-categorized item when they
have non-identical feature values along one dimension but does not move them closer
together when they have identical feature values along a different dimension. This
means that the similarity scaling parameter scales the effect of dissimilarities on the
categorization decision and makes it able to identify the kinds of differences in attention
to similarities versus dissimilarities that Forster (2009) identified.
Finally, there is a response scaling parameter that relates certainty in category
membership to consistency of categorization response (Ashby & Maddox, 1993). If this
value of this parameter is low and people are uncertain about a category membership,
their categorization decisions will vacillate. Some days they will say, “yes, the tie-die
wearing penthouse dweller is a Dead Head,” and some days they will say “no.” If the
value of this parameter is high, and a person is uncertain about category membership, he
or she will consistently give whatever answer is most probable.
The GCM has a few drawbacks for identifying the source of context differences.
First, the GCM assumes that a to-be-categorized item gets compared to all known
exemplars. Depending on how “exemplar” is interpreted, this could mean all memories
for every object ever seen. A person simply could not compare an item to all known
exemplars when trying to place that item into a natural language category with many
members that have each been seen many times. Second, there is debate as to how the
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response scaling parameter relates to the categorization process (e.g., Navarro, 2007;
Smith & Minda, 2002). While so far it has been discussed as if it relates sum similarity to
categorization decisions, it could also be interpreted as directly impacting how similarity
is calculated or how exemplars are sampled for the sake of comparison.
The GCM (in different incarnations) has been applied to between-group
differences in categorization at least twice. A between-group parameter difference in
the GCM was used as evidence against a claim of multiple memory systems, one that
is damaged in amnesiacs and one that is intact (Nosofsky & Zaki, 1998). This claim
stemmed from the finding that amnesiacs performed at chance on a recognition memory
task but performed significantly better at a categorization task that used the same stimuli.
A modified version of the GCM was used to predict the categorization performance of
amnesiac and normal participants by allowing the similarity scaling parameter to vary
between groups. The model did a good job of accounting for between-group differences
in categorization when the amnesiac group was given a small similarity scaling
parameter, indicating that they were unable to differentiate between similar exemplars
in memory. This difference might not impair categorization performance much since
category members look more alike than non-category members, but could greatly impair
recognition memory.
Additionally, the GCM was used to show the source of between-group differences
for participants placed into a happy or sad mood using a traditional, family resemblance
set of categorization stimuli (Zivot, Cohen, & Kapucu, 2012). Zivot, Cohen, and Kapucu
fit the GCM to each participant’s categorization decisions, and found that participants in
a happy mood were more likely than participants in a sad mood to spread their attention
across multiple dimensions. Happy participants, however, were not as successful as
sad participants in identifying the dimensions that allowed them to most effectively
distinguish the two categories from each other.
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EBRW
The EBRW is the final model considered. It is a random-walk model with an
underlying architecture based on the GCM without the response scaling parameter
(Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997). In a random walk model of a categorization decision,
information accumulates over time. When a sufficient amount of information is accrued,
a decision is made. In the EBRW considered here, “in the category” and “out of the
category” represent decisions. Information is accrued in the model by selecting an
exemplar and incrementing the category decision a step in the direction of an “in the
category” or an “out of the category” decision. The probability that a given exemplar is
selected is determined by its similarity to the to-be-categorized item.
For illustration, a mock process of deciding if a honey-dipper is a Spoon is given
in Figure 2. At the start of the process, the categorizer has zero knowledge. First, a spoon
exemplar gets brought to mind, incrementing the decision process one step towards the
“in the category” boundary. Next, a fork exemplar is sampled, incrementing the decision

Figure 2: Example of the random walk process in the EBRW
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process one step towards the “out of the category” boundary. Finally, two more spoons
are sampled and the “In the category” boundary is reached. At this point, the model
predicts that the categorizer makes an “in the category” decision in favor of a honey
dipper being a Spoon.
The EBRW shares dimension weighting and similarity scaling parameters with the
GCM. Instead of a parameter representing consistency of response, it has two parameters
representing the locations of the “In-the-category” and the “Out-of-the-category”
boundaries. When both are far from the zero information point, responses will be highly
consistent and when both are close to the zero information point, responses will be highly
inconsistent. When one boundary is closer than the other to the zero information point,
there will be a bias for giving that response relative to the other.
The EBRW addresses some of the issues in using the GCM for modeling
the impact of context on categorization decisions. First, it does not represent the
categorization decision as comparing a to-be-categorized item to all known exemplars.
Instead, the to-be-categorized item is compared to only enough exemplars for a
categorization decision to be made. The model calculates the probability that a given
exemplar will be influential in the categorization decision, which can be an interesting
source of between-group differences in-and-of itself. Second, the EBRW’s boundary
parameters allow it to account for an inclusivity or exclusivity bias that is directly built
into the categorization process. If participants exhibit an overall bias to put items in a
category (or exclude items from a category) it can be directly observed as a change in the
boundary parameters.
The added complexity provided by the EBRW comes at a price: the model
requires additional data. In order to determine category boundaries (that is, how much
information is required for each categorization decision) the EBRW models response
times (RT) as well as categorization decisions. This places methodological constraints on
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using the EBRW and means that it cannot be used to model categorization data collected
without concurrent RT.
Modeling Natural Language Categorization
In order to identify the between-group differences observed by Rock and
Janoff-Bulman (2010), any model selected will have to be able to account for natural
language categorization decisions. While a few attempts have been made to model
context effects on categorization with artificial stimuli, this has not been done for natural
language categories. In fact, to date, there have been only a handful of the attempts of
applying models of categorization decisions to natural language categories (Verbeemen,
Vanpaemel, Pattyn, Storms, & Verguts, 2007; Verheyen, Hampton, & Storms, 2010;
Voorspoels et al., 2008) plus one attempt at modeling fruit and vegetable categorization
decisions (Smits, Storms, Rosseel, & De Boeck, 2002).
Applying similarity-based models of categorization to natural language categories
requires that two major hurdles be overcome. First, similarity-based models require
a similarity space that relates items to each other. Second, exemplar-based models
require a set of items of known category membership to populate their exemplar space.
Researchers have dealt with the similarity problem either by generating a feature
applicability matrix (Smits et al., 2002; Verbeemen et al., 2007) or by using participants’
similarity judgments (Voorspoels et al., 2008). A feature applicability matrix is created
by having one group of participants generate a list of potential features that category
members could have and then having a second group determine if each feature is
applicable to each potential category member. The resulting matrix is subjected to
multi-dimensional scaling (MDS) as a data-reduction technique to generate a tractable
set of dimensions. As an example of MDS, imagine every city in the United States
was represented by a matrix of distances from every other city. MDS would convert
these distances into the set of coordinates for each city that best preserves the distance
relationship between cities. For items of known category membership, researchers
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assumed that item familiarity was equivalent to category knowledge, and either used
familiar items to predict the categorization judgments of unfamiliar items (Smits et
al., 2002; Verbeemen et al., 2007) or just used typicality judgments within a category
as a dependent measure and assumed that fuzzy category membership would not be
problematic (Voorspoels et al., 2008).
A few concerns regarding these methods will be mentioned now and more fully
addressed in the Method section of modeling Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) data.
First, feature listing causes both theoretical and practical problems. People have been
shown to list different features based on context (Wu & Barsalou, 2009), and feature lists
are a binary judgment (i.e., present vs. absent) whereas many features are continuous
or fuzzy. Methods for determining category membership for the purposes of modeling
categorization decisions are also a cause for concern. Category membership determined
a priori by the experimenters depends upon the experimenter’s judgment for the answer
to the very question being asked of participants in the experiment (Smits et al., 2002;
Verbeemen et al., 2007). If questions of category membership were clear, there would not
be fuzzy categories or court cases about the category membership of tomatoes. Attempts
to circumvent the problem by just looking at typicality as measured by within-category
similarity (Voorspoels et al., 2008) are also problematic because they ignore evidence
that typicality is related to both increased similarity to In-the-category members and
decreased similarity to “out of the category” members (Rosch & Mervis, 1975; Verheyen,
De Deyne, Dry, & Storms, 2011).
In spite of these concerns, the studies of natural language categorization cited
above have been a good first step, showing promising methods and addressing issues
of concern to categorization as a field. As a proof-of-concept, Smits et al. (2002)
showed that models of categorization decisions can be applied to categories learned
outside the laboratory and that people’s knowledge of category members are good
predictors of their categorization behavior when encountering an unknown item. Both
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Smits et al. and Voorspoels et al. (2008) tested whether an exemplar model (the GCM)
or prototype model provided a better fit of categorization responses and found that
the GCM accounted for categorization decisions better. Verbeemen et al. (2007) used
natural language categories to test the Varying Abstraction Framework (Vanpaemel
& Storms, 2008), a subgrouping model of categories that exists as an intermediary
between prototype and exemplar theories. Previous findings in favor of a subgrouped
representation are strengthened by their success modeling real-world items. In an
ideal world, however, these subgroups would be intuitively sensible (e.g., there is no
identifiable reason why nectarines, oranges, tangerines, plums, and cherries and all placed
into a single group).
The GCM Defined
As discussed above, the GCM is promising model for accounting for the betweengroup differences observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010). First, the parameters
of the GCM capture a number of the components of categorization that prior research
has shown can be affected by approach and avoidance mode. Second, the GCM has
been previously been used to model natural language categories. This makes it a good
starting point for identifying the stage in categorization where avoidance mode affects
Conservatives’ categorization decisions (Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010). For the purposes
of this dissertation, the GCM will be used to model between-group differences when RT
is not available. This section will outline the formal properties of the model.
Formally defined, the first step in the categorization process according to the
GCM is to calculate the distance between the to-be-categorized item and all exemplars
within a similarity space. The formula for calculating the distance d between to-becategorized item i and exemplar j is,
		

(1)
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where m is the dimension being evaluated, wm is the weight placed on that dimension, and
xjm is the value of exemplar j along dimension m. In this model, all dimension weights
must be greater than or equal to zero, and must sum to one. These dimension weights
allow one dimension to be favored over another for the purposes of categorization. If, for
some reason, tie-color was important for telling Republicans from Democrats but shoe
color was not, weight would be placed on the tie dimension (wtie = 1) but not on the shoe
dimension (wshoe = 0) .
The next step in the categorization process is to convert distance to similarity (η).
The ηij between to-be-categorized item i and exemplar j is determined by the exponential
decay function defined by Shepard,
		

(2)
	
  
where c is the similarity scaling parameter. With a high c value, only the only exemplars
considered similar to the item are the ones that are very close in similarity space.

The probability of an “In-the-category judgment” (pi) can be found by taking its
similarity to exemplars in category A (SiA),
		

(3)

	
  
as well as its similarity to exemplars not in category A (SiB),

		

(4)

	
  
and dividing SiA by the sum similarity to all exemplars,

(5)

		

	
  
The process for determining the probability
of giving a “not-In-the-category” response
(qi) is similar,
		

(6)

	
  
The EBRW Defined

As noted in the section Modeling the Categorization Process, the EBRW’s
properties also make it a good candidate for accounting for the between-group differences
observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010). First, its parameters are even more

29

analogous than the GCM to the aspects of cognition shown to be affected by approach
and avoidance modes. Furthermore, previous efforts made at fitting the GCM to natural
language categories can be easily translated to the EBRW. For the purposes of this
dissertation, the EBRW will be used to model between-group differences when RT is
available. This section will outline the formal properties of the model.
The EBRW is a random walk model of categorization decisions, where two
categories are represented as absorbing states at the boundaries of the random walk space.
According to the EBRW, the categorization process occurs by sampling exemplars from
memory. The probability that an exemplar is sampled is relative to its similarity to the
to-be-categorized item. Each exemplar sampled moves the random walk state towards
the category boundary that the exemplar belongs to. Reaching one of the absorbing
boundaries represents the end of the categorization decision.
At its core, the EBRW repurposes the formulas from the GCM. According to the
EBRW, pi (the probability of placing item i into category A) becomes the probability that
an exemplar from category A will be sampled by memory and therefore the probability
that a step will be taken towards the category A boundary (Figure 2). Likewise, qi
becomes the probability that a step will be taken towards the category B boundary. The
probability that an item i will be put into category A is represented by
		

(7)

The parameter A in this equation 	
  represents the “In-the-category” boundary – its distance
above the zero-information point. Likewise, parameter B in this equation represents the

“Out-of-the-category” boundary – its distance below the zero information point. As one
becomes larger than the other, the model will predict a bias to respond with the category
that has the closer boundary. As both boundaries get farther from the zero-information
point, the model predicts less probability matching and more consistent categorization
responses.
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The EBRW also uses the sum similarity (Equation 3) to predict response time to
each stimulus. Specifically, it predicts that the time to take any step in the random walk
process (E(Tstep)) for item i is given by,
E(Tstep | i) = α +1(SiA + SiB ),
		
(8)
	
  
where α is a constant that represents the time for cognitive tasks that are independent
of the similarity calculation
€
and therefore are common across all items, such as time to
visually encode the jellyfish or press a button once a categorization decision has been
reached. Note that as similarity to either category increases, the time required to retrieve
an exemplar and make a step in the random walk process decreases.
The EBRW predicts that the total number of steps required during the random
walk process (E(N)) for a given item i is a function of both the probability of placing
item i in the category or not (Equations 4 and 5), as well as the distance of the decision
boundaries A and B from the zero-information point (for in and Out-of-the-category,
respectively):
		

(9)

The predicted amount of	
   time it should take to categorize an item can be found by
multiplying Equation 8 by Equation 9.

Locating the Effects of Mode in the EBRW
To better understand how these parameters can account for the effects of
motivation on cognition, an example category decision will be modeled with the EBRW
(Figure 3). Four exemplars are known: two from category A and two from category
B, while the to-be-categorized item is represented by ‘?”. Each exemplar has two
dimensions that can take a value from 1 to 5, plotted along axes X and Y. According
to the EBRW, when attention is evenly divided across both dimensions (i.e., w1 = 0.5,
w2 = 0.5), the similarity scaling parameter is small (i.e., c = 1), and both boundaries are
close and equidistant from the zero-information boundary (i.e., A = 1, B = 1), then there
is a 33% chance of putting item “?” into category A, and a 66% chance of putting it into
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Figure 3:Example of a categorization decision as described by the EBRW
category B. This is because the to-be-categorized item is most similar to the category B
exemplar (5,2), followed by the category A exemplar (3,1).
To see how these parameters impact categorization decisions and capture the
effects of motivation on cognition, imagine putting all the attention weight on dimension
x (i.e., w1 = 1, w2 = 0) while holding all other parameters the same. This would collapse
the exemplars across the y dimension. Now, the to-be-categorized item is identical to both
category B exemplars but it would remain equally dissimilar to the category A exemplars.
The EBRW now predicts a 7% probability “?” will be put into category A. With all the
weight on dimension y, however, the to-be-categorized item becomes identical to both A
exemplars. Now the EBRW predicts an 82% probability that “?” will be put into category
A. Note that the two values are not reciprocal. This is because the to-be-categorized
item is more similar to exemplar B(5,2) when the x dimension is collapsed than it is
to exemplar A(3,1) with the y dimension collapsed. The EBRW’s ability to change
dimension weights makes it a good model to test the theory that motivational states affect

32

the way attention is distributed during categorization (e.g., Förster et al., 2006; P. A.
Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008)
Now imagine that attention is equally distributed across dimensions but the
similarity scaling parameter (c) is increased. As c gets larger, the probability that the
to-be-categorized item will be placed into category A decreases exponentially from .20
when c = 2, to .06 when c = 4, to essentially zero when c = 7. This is because when
the similarity scaling parameter is low, items that are only moderately similar (such as
A(3,1)) can still have an impact on the categorization decision. When c is high, however,
only the most similar items can influence categorization decisions (i.e., B(5,2)). In this
way, the EBRW can test the theory that approach and avoidance impacts whether people
attend to what makes things similar or what makes them different. A low c parameter
reflects a categorizer that is looking for similarities and is including information from
exemplars that are only moderately similar. A high c parameter reflects a categorizer that
is looking for dissimilarities and is only including information from the most similar
exemplars, pushing away moderately typical exemplars. This makes the EBRW a good
model for testing the theory that motivational state changes whether a person looks for
similarities or dissimilarities (e.g., Förster, 2009).
Changing the boundary parameters, A and B, can have two different types
of effects depending on whether they move equidistantly from the zero-information
point or one moves more than the other. As A and B equally increase in distance from
the zero-information point, categorization becomes more deterministic. A categorizer
with boundaries far apart from each other would be highly consistent—more likely to
repeatedly put the same in item into the same. In this example, the to-be-categorized
item has twice as much similarity to exemplars from category B than category A. When
boundaries A and B both equal 1, the model predicts the categorizer will say B 66% of
the time. As the boundaries move farther apart, the model predicts the categorizer will say
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B more and more frequently: 89% of the time when A and B equal 3 and 97% of the time
when A and B equal 5.
When one boundary increases and the other remains the same, this creates a
bias to respond to the category with the closer boundary. A categorizer with a bias to
respond “In-the-category” would be a more inclusive categorizer and a categorizer with
a bias to respond “Out-of-the-category” would be a more exclusive categorizer. In the
current example, as A remains 1 but B moves farther away, the probability of saying A
increases from 33% when B = 1, to 46% when B = 3 and plateaus at 49% when B = 5
and higher. In sum, between-group differences in boundary locations in the EBRW model
can indicate whether participants in one motivation condition are changing their decision
biases (Markman et al., 2005) or are making more consistent categorization decisions.
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Chapter 3
OVERVIEW OF EXPERIMENTS
Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) showed that Conservatives in avoidance
mode were more exclusive categorizers of natural language category members than
Conservatives in approach mode. They did not find a difference between Liberals in
approach and avoidance mode. The purpose of this dissertation is to use two exemplarbased models of categorization, the GCM and EBRW, to describe these between-group
differences.
Experiment 1 fits the EBRW to the categorization decisions of Conservative and
Liberal participants in approach and avoidance modes using artificially generated stimuli.
The stimuli in Experiment 1 have clearly defined dimensions that can be accounted
for by mathematical models of categorization. These artificial stimuli are typical of the
categorization experiments to which the EBRW has previously been applied (Nosofsky
& Palmeri, 1997; Nosofsky & Alfonso-Reese, 1999). The purpose of this experiment
is to use the EBRW to identify the components in the categorization process where this
between-group difference occurs.
Experiment 2 fits the GCM to data from Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010)
Experiment 1. Exemplar-based models have been fit to natural language categorization
decisions (Verbeemen et al., 2007; Voorspoels et al., 2008). There has not been
consistency across prior studies in which the GCM has been fit to natural language
categories, and some methods are not amenable to identifying between-group
categorization differences. This experiment has two purposes: 1) to provide a testing
ground for generating information required by both the GCM and the EBRW to fit
between-group differences in natural language categorization decisions; and 2) to
identify differences in the components of categorization that underlie the between-group
differences observed by Rock and Janoff-Bulman.
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Experiment 3 fit the EBRW to data that replicated Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s
(2010) Experiment 1 for two categories and extended it by collecting RTs and adding
stimuli to each of the two categories. Rock and Janoff-Bulman collected data on
categorization decisions for 12 items per category and do not record RT. Parameters
of the EBRW may provide a better analog than the GCM for differences in cognition
observed between people in approach and avoidance mode, but the EBRW cannot be
fit to Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s data because they did not record RT. The purpose of
Experiment 3 is to fit the EBRW to natural language categories in order to locate the
source of differences between Liberals and Conservatives in approach and avoidance
mode in categorization decisions.
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Chapter 4
EXPERIMENT 1
Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) found that Conservatives in avoidance mode
were more exclusive categorizers of moderately typical items than Conservatives in
approach mode, but did not find this difference for Liberals. Experiment 1 uses the
EBRW to show the components in the categorization process in which this betweengroup difference occurs by replicating Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s findings with artificial
stimuli. The EBRW has been shown to successfully model categorization decisions using
these types of stimuli (e.g., Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997; Nosofsky & Alfonso-Reese,
1999).
The EBRW is a promising model for locating these effects because aspects of
cognition that approach and avoidance mode have been shown to impact have analogs
in the model’s parameters. Approach and avoidance mode have been shown to affect the
spread of attention across dimensions (Friedman & Förster, 2005; P. A. Gable & HarmonJones, 2008). The EBRW has parameters representing the amount of attention given to
each dimension of the to-be-categorized item. Approach and avoidance mode impact how
much attention is given to dimensions along which items are similar versus dimensions
along which items are different (Förster, 2009). The EBRW has a similarity scaling
parameter that scales the effect of dissimilarities on a categorization decision. Approach
and avoidance mode can impact where decision criteria are established (Markman
et al., 2005). The EBRW has random walk boundaries A and B, which can change
independently representing a bias to respond “In-the-category” or “Out-of-the-category.”
Additionally, as A and B move farther away from each other, categorization decisions
become more consistent.
Experiment 1 uses artificial stimuli: computer drawn jellyfish that vary along
four dimensions. Similar stimuli have been used in many efforts to model categorization
judgments (e.g., Kruschke, 1992; Love et al., 2004; Nosofsky, 1984). As discussed
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in the Literature Review, these stimuli offer a number of attractive features for
operationalizing the stages of the categorization process. First, the stimuli are unknown
to the participants, who theoretically do not enter the experiment with preconceived
ideas about which features are important and which are not. Second, they have a limited
number feature values (e.g., round vs. square heads, color saturation values, line length)
along dimensions that are obvious to the categorizer and are amenable to mathematical
modeling. Third, these stimuli can have family resemblance structures built into them,
making them potential stand-ins for complex real-world categories (e.g., Medin &
Schaffer, 1978).
Stimuli typically used in categorization experiments are comprised of dimensions
with binary feature values and are often based on the 5/4 category structure created by
Medin and Schaffer (1978). In real world items, however, features are rarely just present
or absent; they usually exist along a continuum (e.g., height and color) or are ambiguous
(e.g., having wings—consider flying squirrels). Furthermore, the use of binary feature
values gives rise to concerns that participants encounter so few permutations that they
merely memorize which items are associated with which category labels (Blair & Homa,
2003). The use of stimuli with features that vary continuously along a set of dimensions
mitigates this concern. The features of the jellyfish used in this experiment vary
continuously along four dimensions: 1) color of the internal organs, 2) diameter of the
bell, 3) thickness of the bell, and 4) tentacle length.
Method
Participants
Participants were recruited from University of Massachusetts, Amherst
psychology subject pool. Students in this pool answered four questions about their
political identity as part of a questionnaire administered at the beginning of the semester
(see Appendix A). Participants were recruited based on their responses to these questions.
The answer to the fourth question was reverse-coded and all four responses were
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averaged together to generate a mean political identity score with a range of 1(Liberal) to
7(Conservative). In Spring Semester 2011, all pre-screening respondents (n=1200) had
an average political identity score of 3.4 with a standard deviation of 1.0. Students were
identified as liberal if their score was one standard deviation or more below the mean or
as conservative if their score was one standard deviation or more above the mean.
Students identified as liberal or conservative were contacted via email and
invited to participate in either this experiment, identified as “Categorizing Jellyfish,” or
in Experiment 3, identified as “Categorizing Everyday Objects.” Recruitment occurred
across three semesters. The mean and standard deviation of this political score was
essentially unchanged across all three semesters. For the Spring Semester 2011 μ = 3.4
and σ = 1.0, for the Fall Semester 2011 μ = 3.5 and σ = 1.0, and for the Spring Semester
2012 μ = 3.5 and σ = 1.0. The selection criterion from Spring Semester 2011 was used
for all three semesters. This selection criterion identified roughly one-third of the students
as potential participants each semester. Participants were not allowed to sign up for both
studies.
One hundred and twenty seven University of Massachusetts, Amherst students
participated in this study (33 males and 106 females). Data from four of these participants
were not included in this analysis due to computer error. Of the remaining participants, 50
were identified as political conservatives and 73 were identified as political liberals. Forty
participants were placed into the approach condition (20 Liberals, 20 Conservatives),
41 in the neutral condition (23 Liberals, 18 Conservatives), and 42 in the avoidance
condition (30 Liberals, 12 Conservatives).
Materials
The stimuli for this experiment consisted of 16 jellyfish, generated in
Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997; Pelli, 1997). For example jellyfish, see Figure 4. The
jellyfish were designed with features that varied continuously along four dimensions:
1) color of the internal organs, 2) diameter of the bell, 3) thickness of the bell, and 4)
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tentacle length. The stimuli were generated according to one of two methods, one for
category member items and one for non-category items.
The category member jellyfish were generated by adding normally distributed
noise to each feature value of the prototype. The prototype had organ colors with an
RBG values of [145, 0, 0], a bell diameter of 420 × 210 pixels, a bell thickness of 6.45
points, and a tentacle length of 25 pixels per segment. (There were nine segments.)
Figure 4B shows the prototype jellyfish. Three types of category member jellyfish—
highly typical, moderately typical, and atypical—were generated based on a prototype,
which was not shown during the experiment. Three jellyfish were generated for each
level of typicality, for a total of nine category member jellyfish stimuli. For highly typical
category members, the normally distributed noise was set at one standard deviation for
each dimension. (See Appendix Table C1 for standard deviation values). For moderately
typical category members, normally distributed noise was set at two standard deviations
for each dimension. For atypical category members, normally distributed noise was set
at three standard deviations for each dimension. These category member jellyfish were
considered as belonging to a category since they all had features similar to the prototype
and therefore similar to each other. Highly typical jellyfish were most likely to have
all their features similar to each other and dissimilar to non-category member jellyfish.
Seven non-category member jellyfish were generated by selecting each dimension’s
feature value at random from a uniform distribution. Figure 4A and Figure 4C present

Figure 4: Example jellyfish stimuli. A) Minimum non-category jellyfish values, B)
Prototype jellyfish values, C) Maximum non-category jellyfish values (Participants did
not see any of these jellyfish during the experiment.)
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the minimum and maximum values for the non-category member jellyfish, respectively.
Feature values for each of the 16 stimuli are given in Appendix Table C2. All participants
saw the same 16 jellyfish.
Procedure
Upon arriving at the experiment, participants gave their informed consent to
participate and were brought to a room containing an individual computer. Participants
received all instructions for the experiment from this computer. After being welcomed
to the study, they were told that a new species of jellyfish had been discovered (Aurelia
diatribi) and their task was to learn to distinguish category member jellyfish from noncategory member jellyfish. During the introduction, they were told the four dimensions
essential to categorizing the jellyfish.
In the training stage of the experiment, participants were trained on four category
member jellyfish (High 1-3 and Medium 1) and four non-category jellyfish (Non-category
1-4). These jellyfish were selected for training to provide participants with a strong sense
of the feature values associated with the category and to allow for as much variability in
categorizing atypical items as possible, since participants were not trained on atypical
stimuli. In Appendix Table C2, all training stimuli are bolded.
On every trial during training, participants were shown a jellyfish and asked if it
belonged to the category. After making a categorization decision, they received feedback;
either “Correct” accompanied by a pleasant tone or “Incorrect” accompanied by a beep. A
training block consisted of a run through all eight training jellyfish, presented in a random
order. Training continued until either a participant correctly categorized two blocks of
jellyfish in a row or they completed 15 blocks.
In the second stage, participants were primed for approach mode, avoidance
mode, or a neutral condition. This priming was based on the amoral prime reported in
Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Participants in all conditions were given five minutes to
list up to ten movies. Participants in the approach condition were asked to list movies to
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watch for an enjoyable time, those in the neutral condition were asked to list movies they
had seen recently, and those in the avoidance condition were asked to list movies to not
watch to avoid a bad time. These primes were intended to focus approach participants on
what they should do (i.e., movies they should watch) and avoidance participants on what
they should not do (i.e., movies they should avoid). The effectiveness of these primes
was considered exploratory in Rock and Janoff-Bulman. The full text of the priming
instructions is provided in Appendix B.
In the third stage, participants were asked to categorize jellyfish without feedback.
In this stage, each block consisted of sixteen jellyfish: the eight that participants had
been trained on and eight new jellyfish: two moderately typical, three atypical, and
three non-category member jellyfish. On each trial, participants saw a jellyfish, made an
“In-the-category” or an “Out-of-the-category” judgment, and were thanked rather than
given feedback. Participants completed ten blocks of category judgments and the order
of jellyfish presentation was randomized within each block. Therefore, the participants
categorized the 16 jellyfish ten times for a total of 160 categorization judgments. This
stage took approximately five minutes.
In the fourth stage, participants were asked to list three goals they aspired to
achieve and three goals they felt obligated to achieve. The order of these two tasks was
counterbalanced across participants. Response times to these questions are taken as a
check of successful priming with approach or avoidance mode (Friedman & Förster,
2001). Participants the approach mode are expected to respond to faster to desires while
participants in avoidance mode are expected to respond faster to obligations.
Finally, in the fifth stage, participants rated the paired similarity of all sixteen
jellyfish in the study. On each trial, participants saw one jellyfish and then pressed a
button to see the next. They were asked to decide their similarity on a scale of 1(most
dissimilar) to 9(most similar). This scale remained on the bottom of the screen at all
times, and participants were encouraged to use the whole scale. Pair presentation order
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was random and participants were not asked to make similarity judgments about identical
jellyfish.
After completing all five stages, participants were debriefed and thanked for their
participation. On average, the experiment took participants 30 minutes to complete.
Results
Manipulation check
The measure of interest for the manipulation check was calculated according
to Friedman (2001): the amount of time it took participants to start typing each of the
three goals they aspired to accomplish and each of the three goals they were required to
accomplish. Differences in the time to start typing were tested by a 3(Mode) × 2(Question
Type) mixed model ANOVA, with Question Type as a within-subjects factor. First, there
was a main effect of Question Type. Participants were faster to start typing goals that they
aspired to achieve (x = 6.35, s = 3.53) than goals that they were required to achieve (x =
10.04, s = 5.63), F(1,116) = 101.96, p < .001 . There was, however, neither a main effect
of Mode (F(2,116) = 0.81, p = .45) nor an interaction between Mode and Question Type
(F(2,116) = 0.35, p = .71).
Category learning
A participant was considered to have successfully learned the category if they
either got two blocks correct in a row or got seven or more out of eight correct on the last
block of training. By this measure, 91 out of the 123 participants successfully learned
the category. Category learning did not differ either by Mode, χ2(2) = 0.22, p = .90, or
Political Identity χ2(1) = 0.18, p = .67. Only participants who learned the category were
included in further categorization performance and modeling analyses.
Categorization performance
Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) found that Conservatives primed with avoidance
mode were more exclusive when categorizing moderately typical category members as
compared to Conservatives primed with approach mode. The category inclusivity for
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Liberals, however, was the same regardless of whether they were primed with approach
or avoidance mode. Since it is the goal of this study to identify the stage in categorization
that approach and avoidance motivation effects, it is first necessary to show that there was
a difference in the categorization performance of these two groups in this study as well.
In order to identify between-group differences in categorization performance,
the percentage of jellyfish included in the category by each participant was averaged
across highly typical members, moderately typical members, atypical members, and
non-members, resulting in four category-inclusion measures for each participant. As can
be seen in Table 1, category inclusion is high for highly typical and moderately typical
category members, less for atypical members, and low for non-category members. These
results are broken down by gender in Appendix Table F1 and Appendix Table F2.
To normalize the distribution, categorization inclusion percentages were arcsine
transformed and then submitted to a 4(Typicality) × 3(Mode) × 2(Political Identity)
mixed model ANOVA, with Typicality as a within-subjects factor. As expected, there
was a main effect of Typicality, F(3,255) = 534.0, p < .001. Additionally, there was an
interaction between Mode and Political Identity, F(2,85) = 4.2, p < .05. This means
that, averaged across category typicality, there was a difference between Liberals and
Conservatives in how mode affected category inclusion. The three-way interaction
between Mode Manipulation, Political Identity, and Typicality that would have directly
Table 1
Average %yes Judgments (and SE) by Manipulation and Stimulus Type
Group

High

Medium

Atypical

Non-category

Total

Liberal
Approach

.88(.02)

.91(.02)

.76(.04)

.21(.03)

.69(.02)

Neutral

.83(.03)

.83(.04)

.68(.04)

.16(.04)

.62(.03)

Avoidance

.89(.03)

.93(.02)

.75(.03)

.21(.02)

.69(.02)

Approach

.83(.03)

.78(.05)

.68(.03)

.19(.03)

.62(.03)

Neutral

.90(.05)

.90(.05)

.70(.05)

.18(.02)

.67(.03)
.67(.02)

Conservative

Avoidance
Total

.91(.02)

.93(.02)

.70(.04)

.13(.02)

.87(.01)

.88(.02)

.71(.02)

.19(.01)
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replicated Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) results was not significant, F(6,255) = 1.2,
p = .308.
To investigate the interaction between Mode and Political Identity, two different
analyses were performed. First, the proportion of “In-the-category” decisions was
averaged across all four typicality levels (Table 1), creating an overall measure of
category inclusion. Since the result of interest is how approach and avoidance modes
affect categorization decisions, this measure was subjected to two follow-up analyses,
one testing the effect of approach mode and the other testing the effects of avoidance
mode. For participants in approach mode, Liberals were more inclusive categorizers
than Conservatives (Table 1), F(1,28) = 4.4, p < .05. For participants in avoidance mode,
there was no significant difference between Liberal and Conservative participants,
F(1,28) = .885, p = .355.
Additionally, a signal detection analysis was performed on these data. Signal
detection decomposes hit rates and false alarm rates into a measure of participants
abilities to distinguish category members from non-category members (measured in d'),
as well as their criterion for placing an item in the category versus out of the category
(measured in cSD). A cSD of 0 indicates that a categorizer is optimizing their judgments to
maximize percent correct, a negative c indicates that the categorizer is including more
to-be-categorized items than optimal, and a positive c indicates that the categorizer is
excluding more to-be-categorized items than optimal. Hit rates were measured as the
percentage of all category members included in the category and false alarms were
measured as the percentage of all non-category members included in the category. Hit
rates at ceiling were transformed by subtracting one included category member and false
alarm rates at floor were transformed by adding one included non-category member. The
average results for these analyses are reported in Table 2.
Both d' and cSD were submitted to a 3 (Mode) × 2 (Political Identity) ANOVA.
For d', there were no significant between group differences. The ability to distinguish
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Table 2
Average Parameter Values (and SE) for Signal Detection Analysis
Group

d'

cSD

Approach

1.95(0.12)

-0.10(0.07)

Neutral

2.08(0.15)

0.12(0.11)

Avoidance

2.08(0.12)

-0.18(0.07)

Approach

1.74(0.18)

0.08(0.08)

Neutral

2.08(0.18)

-0.09(0.10)

Avoidance

2.27(0.09)

0.08(.09)

Liberal

Conservative

category members from non-category members did not differ between Mode
(F(2,85) = 2.30, p = .11), between Political Identity (F(1,85) = 0.01, p = .94), nor was
there an interaction between the two (F(2,85) = 0.81, p = .45). For cSD, while there was
no main effect of Mode (F(2,85) = 0.24, p = .79) or Political Identity (F(1,85) = 0.97,
p = .33), the interaction between the two was significant (F(2,85) = 3.75, p < .05). Follow
up analyses of this interaction show that there are no significant differences between
participants Liberals and Conservatives in approach mode, F(1,28) = 2.50, p = .13.
Liberals in avoidance mode, however, have a more inclusive criterion than Conservatives
in avoidance mode, F(1,28) = 4.32, p < .05.
Modeling
Participants’ categorization decisions and response times were fit with the EBRW.
As outlined in the Literature Review, the EBRW combines an item’s similarity to the
exemplars in the category (SiA) with its similarity to exemplars out of the category (SiB)
to predict both the probability that the item will be categorized as “In-the-category,” as
defined by Equation 7, as well as the RT to that item, as defined by Equations 8 and 9.
Since the EBRW predicts RT in arbitrary units, predicted RT is scaled to milliseconds
by a linear regression, with slope k and intercept μ. For each model, the EBRW was fit
to four different data sets: categorization responses and response times averaged within
Liberals and Conservatives in approach and avoidance mode.1
1

In Experiment 1, the EBRW can be fit to individual participants’ data as well as
46

For the first step in the modeling process, a fully constrained version of the
EBRW was fit to all four data sets. This model found the c, the set of w parameters, the
A and B boundaries, and α that best minimized the weighted sum of squared deviations
(WSSD) between the observed and predicted proportion of “in-the-category” judgments
and observed and predicted average response times for each of the 16 stimuli. The WSSD
method was proposed by Nosofsky and Stanton (2005) as a way to combine these two
error sources, which are measured on different scales. WSSD weights the error of each
prediction by the inverse of the data point’s squared standard error. Therefore, category
decisions and RT are standardized to a similar scale and data points with smaller
variability play a larger role in the fit measure. The fully constrained model was run 100
times with random starting points to guard against local minima, and the parameters
from the best fitting model were kept. Next, this model was run again 100 times with the
best fitting parameters as its starting point, with each parameter permuted by normally
distributed noise (N(0,1)).
The next step in model fitting was to allow parameters to vary between groups.
The data were fit with models that allowed either c, all w weights, A, B or both A and B
to vary between groups. Parameters were allowed to vary one of three ways: between
Liberals and Conservatives participants, participants in approach mode and avoidance
mode, and Conservatives in avoidance mode compared to all others. This last model
was included because of the interaction found by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). Each
model was fit 100 times using the best fitting parameters of the fully constrained model
plus normally distributed noise as starting points. The predictions of the best fitting
models can be found in Appendix Table F4.
Since the EBRW has no known likelihood fit measure (Nosofsky & Stanton,
2005), models in Experiment 1 were compared with cross-validation (Browne, 2000).
averaged data. Although this method is recommended when possible (Maddox, 1999), to
do so for Experiment 1 would mean that each data point being modeled is the average of
only ten trials. The EBRW was fit to individual participant’s data and statistical tests of
the parameters are reported Appendix Table F3.
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Cross-validation fits the model to one set of data and tests it on another. It is based on
the assumption that a model that is too complex will adjust its parameters to fit noise in
the data and do a poor job of predicting new data. Cross-validation was implemented by
cycling through each to-be-categorized item, fitting each of the models with that item’s
categorization and RT data withheld, and then using the resulting parameters to predict
the withheld data. Each model’s cross-validation fit measure is the average of its WSSD
across all predicted data points, and this value can be found in the Appendix Table F4.
The best fitting model allowed the c parameter to vary between Conservatives
in avoidance mode and all other participants. Figure 5 shows the averaged category
inclusion rates and model predictions and Figure 6 shows the averaged RT and model
predictions. These data were best fit by a model that allowed Conservatives in avoidance
mode to have a larger c parameter (cConAvo = 1.20) than other participants (cOther = 0.58).
This indicates that, for Conservatives in avoidance mode, the functional relationship
between psychological distance and psychological similarity dropped off more steeply
than for other participants.
Discussion
Liberal and Conservative participants in Experiment 1 were primed with approach
or avoidance mode and then made categorization decisions about a newly learned
category. Analyses of the categorization performance indicate that, overall, Liberals
were more inclusive categorizers than Conservatives. ANOVA analyses show that in
approach mode they are more inclusive overall and signal detection analyses show that
in avoidance mode, Liberals have a more inclusive criterion than Conservatives. When
the EBRW model of categorization was fit to individual participant’s categorization
decisions, analyses indicate that Conservatives in avoidance mode had a larger c
parameter. These results provide evidence that exemplar-based models in general,
and the EBRW specifically, can be used to account for between-group differences
in categorization decisions. While the manipulation check did not find significant
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Figure 5: Average and model predicted percent “in-category” judgments by stimulus

Figure 6: Average and model predicted RT by stimulus
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differences between-groups, inferential statistics of the categorization performance
indicate that the manipulation may have been effective.
In previous applications of the GCM (e.g., Nosofsky, 1987; Nosofsky & Zaki,
1998) and the EBRW (Nosofsky & Palmeri, 1997), the scaling parameter is taken
as a measure of memory - how well participants can distinguish one exemplar from
another. Nosofsky and Palmeri showed that the categorization and memory performance
differences between normal participants and amnesiacs could be modeled with just
a change in the scaling parameter, indicating that the amnesiacs’ deficit came from a
reduced ability to distinguish between exemplars. Nosofsky (1987) showed that when
participants learned a category over many learning trials across a number of sessions, the
scaling parameter increased across sessions, indicating an improved ability to distinguish
between exemplars.
It is not necessary to conclude, however, that being in avoidance mode increased
the Conservative participants’ ability to distinguish between exemplars but did not do so
for Liberal participants. Another interpretation is that avoidance mode made Conservative
participants less willing to factor moderately similar exemplars into their categorization
decisions. For these conservative participants, the to-be-categorized items were put into
the same category as exemplars that were highly similar to them. The distance calculation
of the EBRW (Equation 1) starts at zero distance between an item and an exemplar and
only increases when there are dissimilarities between the two. An increased similarity
scaling parameter, therefore, can be interpreted as placing an increased weight on
dissimilarities.
There are two theories about the way in which approach and avoidance mode
impacts the distribution of attention. Some researchers have found evidence that approach
and avoidance modes modulate the focus of attention from the big picture to the fine
details (e.g., Friedman & Förster, 2005; P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008), while others
have found that approach and avoidance modulates how attention is distributed across
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dimensions that highlight similarities or differences (Förster, 2009). These theories are
not necessarily in competition with each other and parameter differences in the EBRW
could have found evidence for both. That said, the results of this study can be taken as
evidence for the theory that avoidance focuses people on dissimilarities. This effect,
however, was only found for Conservatives. Liberals were likely not as susceptible to
the avoidance mode manipulation, since approach mode is found to be dominant in the
personality of Liberals (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008; Rock & Janoff-Bulman, 2010).
The impacts of the mode manipulation were modest in Experiment 1. The
category-inclusion ANOVA analysis, the signal detection analysis, and the modeling
analysis all found significant differences between different groups within the study. It is
possible that the approach and avoidance manipulation did not succeed in significantly
manipulating participants’ mode or perhaps the task of categorizing previously unseen
items washed out much of the experimentally generated context. What is most important
for the purposes of this dissertation, however, is that the EBRW was able to capture the
source of reliable difference between Liberals and Conservatives.
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Chapter 5
EXPERIMENT 2
Experiment 1 showed that an exemplar-based model of categorization, the EBRW,
can be used to identify between-group differences in components of the categorization
process for artificial stimuli. In order to account for the effects of avoidance mode
observed in Conservatives by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010), exemplar-based models
must also be able to identify between-group differences for natural language category
stimuli. The GCM, a related exemplar-based model of categorization, has already been
applied to natural language categories (Verbeemen et al., 2007; Verheyen et al., 2010;
Voorspoels et al., 2008). None of these studies of natural language categorization,
however, have used the GCM to identify between-group differences in components of the
categorization process.
To show that exemplar-based models can identify components of the
categorization process in which natural language categorization differs between
categorizers in approach versus avoidance mode, Experiment 2 will fit the GCM to the
data collected by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). The GCM is used to model these data
because the GCM does not require RTs, which were not collected by Rock and JanoffBulman. As discussed in the Literature Review, the GCM compares a to-be-categorized
item to exemplars and categorizes it based on the category membership of the exemplars
to which it is most similar. The GCM shares a number of parameters with the EBRW (c
and the w attention weights). These parameters break down the categorization process in
a way that provides analogs with the ways that approach and avoidance mode have been
shown to impact the spread of attention.
Fitting the GCM to these data will provide a test for generating information
required by both the GCM and the EBRW to fit between-group differences in natural
language categorization decisions, such as identifying objective methods of generating a
similarity space and supplying a set of exemplars. Previous researchers who have applied
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the GCM to natural language categories have based their similarity space on a subjective
list of features for each exemplar (e.g., Smits et al., 2002; Storms, De Boeck, & Ruts,
2001; Verbeemen et al., 2007; Voorspoels et al., 2008). Typically, these researchers have
one group of participants generate a list of features that could apply to the whole category
and have a second group decide whether these features are applicable to each exemplar.
The resulting feature matrix is then transformed to a set of coordinate points with MDS.
Researchers have advocated this method over pairwise similarity ratings based on its
improved correlation with category related measures such as typicality ratings and
response time (Dry & Storms, 2009; Vanpaemel, Verbeemen, Dry, Verguts, & Storms,
2010).
Using feature lists, however, can cause problems for modeling between-group
differences. One concern is that dimensions that are important in certain contexts may
not be generated in other contexts and therefore may be missed. Wu and Barsalou
(2009) found that when participants were asked to list the properties related to a
concept, participants’ responses depended on how they mentally simulated that concept.
Similarly, Murphy and Medin (1985) argue that concepts have an infinite set of features
whose importance relative to their category membership depends on the context in
which they are placed. Finally, dimensions based on feature lists incorporate categorical
judgments about the values of those features, which is problematic when feature values
are continuous. Some participants may not list features with continuous values, so a
dimension for those features will not be created. For example, a dimension of “wings”
is based on discrete feature values like absent or present, but in the case of a flying
squirrel—a creature that only moderately has wings—some participants may not list
wings as a feature, so a dimension of “wings” will not be created.
Modeling Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) data allows for an exploration of
more objective methods of creating a similarity space. Instead of subjective judgments,
Latent Semantic Analysis ( LSA, Deerwester, Dumais, Furnas, Landauer, & Harshman,
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1990; Landauer, Foltz, & Laham, 1998) will be used to generate a similarity space
and the best MDS scaling result will be identified by comparing it to Rosch’s (1975)
typicality data.
Method
The Original Study
The data used in Experiment 2 come from Experiment 1 of Rock and JanoffBulman (2010). Their study was conducted to identify differences in the effect of
approach and avoidance mode on the categorization decisions of participants from across
the political spectrum. First, participants were primed with either approach or avoidance
mode using questions about movies or moral behavior. Participants in a neutral condition
had no prime. After priming, participants were asked to make a series of categorization
decisions for 60 items from five natural language categories: Carpenters’ Tools, Clothes,
Furniture, Vehicles and Weapons. These items were taken from a larger stimulus set used
by Rosch (1975) and typicality ratings from Rosch’s study were used to select four highly
typical exemplars, four moderately typical exemplars, and four atypical exemplars for
each of the natural language categories. While the current analyses will be performed on
each natural language category separately, Rock and Janoff-Bulman summed responses
across categories and used total number of “Out-of-the-category” judgments as their
dependent variable. As can be seen in Figure 7, they found that for participants in
avoidance mode, exclusivity increased with conservatism, but they did not find this effect
for participants in approach mode.
The Model
Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) data will be reanalyzed by fitting the GCM to
each natural language category. The GCM determines the probability of placing a to-becategorized item in a given category by its similarity to exemplars. Similarity between
the item and members of that category increases the probability of inclusion and its
similarity between the item and exemplars not in the category decreases the probability
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Figure 7: Figure 1 from Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010)
showing the results of their Experiment 1 for moderately
typical items.
of inclusion (Equations 5 and 6). As discussed in the Introduction, a possible explanation
for the effects of approach and avoidance on categorization is that being in approach
mode increases the categorizer’s consistency. That is, instead of probability matching, a
consistent categorizer will almost always place an item in a given category if there is a
greater than chance probability that it is a member. This idea was formalized in the GCM
by Ashby and Maddox (1993), who modified the calculation of similarity (Equation 3)
with the inclusion of γ, termed the determinism parameter,
		

(10)

For a categorizer with a small γ,
	
   the model predicts that items similar to both the

In-the-category exemplars and the Out-of-the-category exemplars will be categorized

probabilistically. For a categorizer with a large γ, the model predicts that these items will
always be categorized as either In-the-category or Out-of-the-category, depending on
which is considered more likely. As an example, imagine deciding whether a yacht is a
Vehicle. Assume that Yacht has a sum similarity to all vehicle exemplars equal to 2 and a
similarity to non-vehicle exemplars equal to 1. When γ equals 1, the GCM predicts that a
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66% of the time. When γ equals 2, the GCM

yacht will be categorized as a vehicle
increases the probability to
probability to

89%.
	
  

	
  

80% and when γ equals 3, the GCM increases the
	
  

Populating the Model with Exemplars

At the heart of an exemplar model is the idea that a to-be-categorized item is
compared to a set of exemplars. The version GCM fit in Experiment 2 will be populated
with a list of exemplars that are potential category members and exemplars associated
with the to-be-categorized items. This is based on the assumption that if you ask a person
if an item is a Vehicle, they are at most likely to compare it with:
1. Exemplars that are known to be vehicles. Other known category members have
been shown to impact unrelated categorization decisions (Brooks, Norman, & Allen,
1991);
2. Exemplars that are similar to vehicles but are not vehicles. An item’s similarity
to members of a contrasting category has been shown to impact categorization decisions
about that item (Verheyen et al., 2011); and
3. Exemplars that are associated with the item through common usage or lexical
effects. Associations between words that are lexical neighbors have been shown to impact
categorization decision times (Rodd, 2004).
As mentioned above, Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) selected their stimuli as a
subset of stimuli used in a study by Rosch (1975). Since Rosch’s original category lists
contained many more items—some highly typical of their category, some highly atypical,
and some related but not in the category—the remainder of these lists were added to the
GCM as exemplars (xj) to flesh out the similarity comparisons of the to-be-categorized
items (xi). The shortest list (Vehicles) had 47 items while the longest lists (Carpenters’
Tools and Weapons) had 60 items.
In addition to potential category members, a to-be-categorized item could bring
to mind exemplars that are associated though common usage. For instance, when a
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couch is Furniture, a categorizer may bring to mind a psychiatrist, even though hopefully
a psychiatrist is not in danger of being mistaken for Furniture. Therefore, for each
stimulus used by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010), up to three words frequently named
during a word association task (Nelson, McEvoy, & Schreiber, 1998) were included in
the exemplar list. The rules for selecting associated words were: 1) they could not be
members of the category in question, 2) they were a concrete noun, and 3) they could not
be related to the target by an IS-A, HAS-A, MADE-OF, or IS-A-TYPE-OF relationship.
These rules assured that every item considered was on the same taxonomic level and
would not lead to awkward questions, like “Is an engine a vehicle?” Such questions
would not be answerable without more information, like “What object does the engine
help to make up?” Only exemplars at the same taxonomic level are useful for making a
categorization decision.
Approximating Category Membership
According to the GCM, a to-be-categorized item is compared to all other
exemplars whose category membership is known. This requires a measure of whether
an exemplar is a member of a given category. WordNet (Princeton University, 2010),
an Internet based dictionary, provided such a measure. WordNet is unique in that it
represents the meaning of a word both through a dictionary definition as well as a series
of taxonomic relations between words as determined by lexicographers.
For the purposes of the model, exemplars were considered a member of a given
category if either their dictionary definition or their taxonomy mentioned the category.
As an example of the later, according to WordNet, a car is a motor vehicle, which is a
self-propelled vehicle, which is a wheeled vehicle, which is a vehicle. Therefore, a car
is considered a vehicle for the purposes of the GCM. It is defined, however, as, “a motor
vehicle with four wheels.” This definition would also be sufficient for it to be considered
a vehicle for the purposes of the GCM. This method, however, presents a problem.
Two of the categories used by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) did not appear reliably

57

indexed and therefore cannot be fit by the GCM using this method. There is no category
of Carpenters’ Tools in Wordnet. Additionally, weapons appear to be haphazardly labeled.
For instance, “knife” has two definitions: one in the taxonomy for Tool and one in the
taxonomy for Weapon, but “switchblade” appears only in the taxonomy for Tool. Fitting
a prototype model as a method to address this will be discussed in the Additional Models
section. Two potential members of the category Furniture are not represented in Wordnet
(“end table” and “night table”) and were removed from the list of exemplars.
Many of the words used as exemplars are polysemous, and category membership
depends on which meaning is selected. For example, a table is not only a piece of
furniture, but a format for arranging information. Therefore, definitions were selected
based on the following criteria: 1) if any one of the definitions was a member of the
category in question, that definition was used, and 2) if multiple definitions were
members of the category in question (e.g., a jumper is a sweater, a children’s cover-all,
and a jacket), the first definition was used.
Determining the Similarity Space
The GCM requires all exemplars to be represented in a multidimensional
similarity space. A more objective way to generate a similarity space than methods
previously used to fit the GCM to natural language categories (Dry & Storms, 2009;
Vanpaemel et al., 2010) is to compute measures of semantic distance based on LSA
(Deerwester et al., 1990; Landauer et al., 1998). LSA uses collections of digitized texts
and defines a word’s meaning as the index of the various passages in which it occurs. The
similarity between two words can be calculated by the overlap of the contexts in which
they co-occur (as well as co-not-occur). Using a variety of passages for LSA ensures
that words will occur in a variety of contexts so that context-dependent similarity can be
captured. For the purposes of fitting the GCM, passages were taken from books on the
website Project Gutenberg that were selected as being appropriate for college freshmen.
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Again, these three measures were evaluated on their ability to predict Rosch’s
typicality data. Rosch (1975) herself defines an item as being typical of its category when
it is similar to category members and dissimilar to non-category members and this theory
has been verified empirically (Verheyen et al., 2011). An approximation of category
typicality was generated for each of the three measures by summing the similarity of each
exemplar to all category members (as defined by WordNet) and subtracting its similarity
to non-category exemplars. This produced three typicality measures for each exemplar:
one for each similarity measure.
Converting Similarity to Distance
The next step to fitting the GCM was to convert the similarity space to geometric
locations using MDS. When this technique was applied in Experiment 1, the optimal
number of dimensions for the solution was a priori known to be four: one for each
dimension of the jellyfish. For a natural language category, however, the correct number
of dimensions needs to be inferred. Therefore, a series of MDS solutions were generated
with up to 20 dimensions. For each solution, an item’s distance from category members
(as determined from WordNet) was subtracted from that item’s distance from noncategory members (as determined from WordNet) to create a measure of that item’s
typicality. A typical item would be distant from non-category members and close to
category members and score highly on this measure.
These typicality measures were correlated with Rosch’s (1975) typicality
data. The optimal dimensional solution was identified by locating the “elbow” in the
correlation coefficients, where adding additional dimensions does not notably improve
correlation. A similar criterion for fitting Prototype models to natural language categories
was advocated by Verheyen, Ameel and Storms (2007). Optimal dimensionality and
correlation between the generated measure of typicality and Rosch’s typicality data are
given in Table 3 and graphs of these correlations for all dimensions are given in Appendix
Figure D2.
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Table 3
Optimal Number of MDS Dimensions and Correlation with Measured Typicality by
Category
Clothing

Furniture

Vehicles

r

0.67

0.59

0.48

# of Dimensions

4

7

9

Generating the Data
While the GCM is designed to predict probabilistic categorization behavior, Rock
and Janoff-Bulman (2010) only collected one categorization decision per item from each
participant. This may be a necessity when using natural language stimuli since asking
participants about the same stimulus multiple times may generate demand characteristics
for participants to change their answers. Participants who are asked if an olive is a
fruit many times may think that the experimenter is unhappy with their first response.
Therefore, in order to generate data that can be fit by the GCM, categorization responses
were combined across participants to derive the proportion of participants who placed a
given item in the category.
First, participants were grouped by political leaning. Participants in this
experiment were asked the same political identity questions used to identify eligible
participants to Experiment 1 and political identity scores were calculated the same way.
Participants had a mean political identity score of 3.47 and a standard deviation of 0.62.
Liberals were identified as participants whose political identity score was one or more
standard deviation below the mean. Conservatives were identified as participants whose
political identity score was one or more standard deviation above the mean. Participants
with missing or obviously incorrectly entered data were removed from the analysis.
Out of the remaining 139 participants, 66 were identified as liberal and 73 identified as
conservative. Due to the relevance of political leanings to Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s
conclusions, politically neutral participants were excluded from this analysis. Forty-seven
participants were primed with Approach mode (Lib = 25, Con = 22), 59 with Avoidance
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mode (Lib = 24, Con = 35), and 33 were in the Neutral Condition (Lib = 17, Con = 16).
Participants in the moral and amoral primes were combined together, since no difference
between these groups was identified in the original study. Participants’ categorization
decisions were combined within their groups to create the data modeled by the GCM.
Results
Since Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) conclusions concerned Liberals and
Conservatives in approach or avoidance condition, only these four data sets were
modeled. This provided 48 data points to each model (12 to-be-categorized items × 4
groups). The models were fit as follows. First, a fully constrained model was fit that used
the same c, w, and γ parameters for each of the four data sets. This model was run 100
times with random starting points, and the parameters of the best fitting model were kept.
The models were evaluated based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC, Burnham
& Anderson, 2002). AIC uses the log likelihood of a predicted model having produced
the observed data and then penalizes this measure for every parameter in the model. This
method of measuring a model’s fit is appropriate in Experiment 2 because it includes a
likelihood measure for binary categorization responses (Wickens, 1982).
Next, a series of models that allowed between-group variability in parameters
were fit. For each parameter type (c, w, and γ), three types of model were fit. The first
model type allowed the given parameter to vary between participants in approach and
avoidance mode. The second model type allowed the given parameter to vary between
Liberal and Conservative participants. The third model type allowed the given parameter
to vary between Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other participants since this
was the significant interaction identified by Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010). Each
model was fit 100 times, each time starting with the best fitting parameters from the fully
constrained model permuted with random numbers sampled from the normal distribution
N(0,1). The fully constrained model was rerun with the same method of generating
starting values as the other models. Therefore, ten models in total were tested: three
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between-group contrasts for each of the three parameter types, plus the fully constrained
model. Again, AIC was used to select the best fitting model from among these 10 models.
The parameter values and AIC scores for all models are shown in Appendix F.
Clothing
For clothing, the best fitting fully constrained model (five parameters-3 w, c, and
γ) fit with an AIC = 87.8. This model was improved on by allowing γ to vary between
participants in the approach and avoidance conditions (six parameters), AIC = 86.8. The
best fitting model fit both conditions with a c of 31.08, a wrange of .80 and fit participants in
approach mode with a γ of 5.06 and participants in avoidance mode with a γ of 4.03. The
parameter values and AIC scores for all models are shown in Appendix F. Participants
in approach mode were best fit with a higher gamma than participants in avoidance
mode, indicating that they are more consistent than participants in avoidance mode. The
range of w weights, .8, indicates that the majority of attention weight was placed on one
dimension. Figure 8 shows participant performance paired with model predictions.

Figure 8: Best fitting model predictions for Clothing alongside participants’ responses
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Furniture
For furniture, the best fitting fully constrained model (8 parameters-6 w, c, and
γ) fit with an AIC = 215.3. This model was improved on by allowing γ to vary between
Liberals and Conservatives (9 parameters), AIC = 215.0. The best fitting model fit both
conditions with a c of 20.14, a wrange of .51 and fit Liberal participants with a γ of 4.33
and Conservative participants with a γ of 3.58. The parameter values and AIC scores
for all models are shown in Appendix F. Liberals were best fit with a higher γ than
Conservatives, indicating that they categorized more consistently. The w weight range of
.51 implies that participants spread their attention across more dimensions for Furniture
than they did for Clothing. Figure 9 shows participant performance paired with model
predictions.
Vehicles
For vehicles, the best fitting fully constrained model (10 parameters-8 w, c, and
γ) fit with an AIC = 311.9. This model was improved on by allowing γ to vary between

Figure 9: Best fitting model predictions for Furniture alongside participants’ responses
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Conservative participants in the avoidance mode compared with all other participants (11
parameters), AIC = 305.0. The best fitting model fit both conditions with a c of 8.05, a
wrange of .52 and fit Conservative participants in avoidance mode with a γ of 9.97 and all
other participants with a γ of 8.73. The parameter values and AIC scores for all models
are shown in Appendix F. Conservative participants in avoidance mode were best fit with
a higher gamma than Liberal participants or Conservative participants in approach mode.
Again, a w weight range of .51 implies that attention was distributed across multiple
dimensions.
Figure 10 shows participant performance paired with model predictions. Note
that the fits for wheelbarrow and go-cart show more error than other fits so far presented.
For wheelbarrow, this is because WordNet represents wheelbarrows as Vehicles, and the
model is unable to totally disregard this representation when participants do not agree.
While the model can represent uncertainty about a to-be-categorized item based on the
exemplars that it is similar to, it would be an overly flexible model if it could account for

Figure 10: Best fitting model predictions for Vehicles alongside participants’ responses
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any categorization performance with a given similarity space. As for go-carts, WordNet
does not represent them as Vehicles while participants believe that they are. This may be
due to confusion between go-carts (strollers) and go-karts (small racing vehicles).
Additional Modeling Considerations
Alternate Models
This section presents two alternate models that were tested but not included in the
final results because they did not provide a better fit (as measured by AIC) than the more
basic model originally described. The first addresses the effect of exemplar frequency.
In some versions of the GCM (e.g., Nosofsky, 1988), the similarity between a to-becategorized item and an exemplar (Equation 3) is weighted by frequency of the exemplar,
represented by the equation,
		

(11)

	
   item j was shown during the experiment. In
where Νj represents the number of times

some category learning experiments, stimuli are presented at different rates and this is
shown to moderate their impact on future categorization decisions.
Even when people are familiar with items with before they enter the experiment,
they may be much more familiar with some items than others. It is unlikely that
Conservatives and Liberals have substantially different kinds of encounters with objects
in their daily lives (e.g., if conservatives saw more ashtrays than liberals), which could
cause differences in categorization. Instead, it may be important to include an examplar
frequency weight to account for between-item differences in categorization. For example,
people may directly associate chairs with Furniture, and so the chair exemplar would
wholly drive the categorization decision. On the other hand, when people categorize
ashtrays they may include category information from many other items, since people see
few ashtrays and therefore an ashtray’s own category information carries little weight.
These frequency weights do not need to be free parameters (that is, fit to the
categorization data) since every exemplar needs one estimate. Free parameters would
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greatly increase the complexity of the model. Instead, frequency weights can be
approximated from a separate data set. While it is impossible to know for certain how
often University of Massachusetts undergraduates encounter chairs and ashtrays, word
frequency counts from a large corpus such as Subtlex (Brysbaert & New, 2009) are a
good approximation. RT in a lexical decision task has been shown to be (relatively)
sigmoidally related to log10(word frequency/million) (Emmanuel, Kevin, & Marc, 2010).
Based on the assumption that time to make a lexical decision reflects the accessibility of
an exemplar, this log transformation was used to approximate exemplar frequency (Νj in
Equation 11). As examples, a low frequency exemplar such as divan received a weight
of .28 while a high frequency exemplar such as sofa received an activation weight of .68.
Multi-word exemplars, such as high fidelity stereo system, were not indexed in Subtlex,
and were approximated with the average Nj.
For the most part, including frequency information neither improved the model
fit nor qualitatively changed the results. When frequency information was included
for Clothing, the best fitting model also allowed γ to vary between participants in the
approach and avoidance conditions, AIC = 81.53 (as compared to AIC = 86.8 without
it). When included for Furniture, the best fitting model also allowed γ to vary between
Liberal and Conservative participants, AIC = 252.18 (as compared to AIC = 215.0
without it). When frequency information was included for Vehicles, the best fitting model
allowed c to vary between Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other participants,
AIC = 315.6 (as compared to AIC = 305.0 without it).
For two out of the three categories (Furniture and Vehicles), the fit was
worsened by the inclusion of frequency information. For Clothing, the improvement in
fit gained by including frequency information was modest. Additionally, for Clothing
and Furniture, the best fitting models allowed the same parameters to vary as without
frequency information. For Vehicles, the best fitting still allowed parameters to vary
between Conservatives in avoidance mode and all others, but now it identified c as the

66

distinguishing variable. These differences in model performance are not a significant
enough improvement to justify including a model with frequency weights in the results
or in future attempts to fit exemplar-based models of categorization to natural language
categories.
The second alternate model considered was a prototype-based model. Since a
prototype model determines category membership based on the similarity of a to-becategorized item to a category prototype, using a prototype model avoids the requirement
of knowing the category membership for any exemplars, making it possible to model
Weapons and Carpenters’ Tools. A prototype model proposed by Nosofsky (1987)
provides a series of equations similar to the GCM. In this model, distance between the tobe-categorized item and a prototype of category A is given by,
		

(12)

	
  
where PAm is the value of the prototype
for category A along dimension m. Similarity

between item i and prototype PA is given by,

		

(13)

	
  

Similarity to the prototype directly determines the probability of placing the item into
category A,
		

(14)

	
  
where δ is a free parameter representing
a threshold level of similarity to a prototype that
an item must achieve to be placed in that prototype’s category. Note that there is no γ in
this model, since it would be mathematically conflated with the c parameter.
To fit this model, the similarity between all words from Rosch’s (1975) list and
their category label (representing the prototype) were found using LSA, and the best
number of dimensions for the MDS solution was determined by correlating Rosch’s
typicality results with the distance between each word and its category prototype. While
this MDS solution was generated with the same exemplars used in the GCM model, only
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the distances between the to-be-categorized items and the prototype were used in the
model. The other words served only to provide context for the MDS solution.
Parameters were allowed to vary across conditions in exactly the same way as for the
GCM and all models were fit 100 times, using randomly permuted parameters from the
best fitting fully constrained model as starting points. For each of the five categories,
model fit information is given in Table 4.
The prototype model performed worse than the GCM by a number of measures.
First, for all three categories in which there are fit measures for both the GCM and
prototype model, the prototype model provides a worse fit. Second, there is much less
consistency across the best fitting models. For each parameter in the prototype model,
at least one category is best fit by allowing it to vary between groups. Finally, the c
parameter is more difficult to interpret due to its conflation with γ in this model. This
combination of factors makes the results of the prototype model less informative than the
results of the exemplar model, even if its structure allows more data to be modeled.
Falsifiability
An important measure of a model is its falsifiability (Wills & Pothos, 2011).
A model that can account for any result is overly general and does not do a good job
of explaining any phenomena. The falsifiability of the GCM was tested by randomly
reordering the data points across test items and refitting the fully constrained model to
the resulting data sets. That is, the percentage of in-category responses for Cars might be
randomly assigned to Elevators, while Cars may get the percentage in-category responses
Table 4
Results from Best Fitting Prototype Models
# of Dimensions

Best Fitting Model

AIC

Carpenters’ Tools

3

Conservative/Avoidance vs. Others - δ

317.8

Clothing

3

Conservative/Avoidance vs. Others - w

131.7

Furniture

3

Approach vs. Avoidance - c

257.3

Vehicles

3

Fully Constrained

452.3

Weapons

5

Conservative/Avoidance vs. Others - δ

320.4
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for Camels. The model fitting proceeded exactly as described before: for each randomly
ordered data set, the model was fit 100 times, each from a different randomly generated
starting point. Fits were evaluated with AIC and the best fit of the 100 was retained.
Results are reported as AIC values averaged across the ten random orders.
For Clothing, the average AIC of the best fitting models was 1316.3, for Furniture,
the average AIC of the best fitting models was 1273.7, and for Vehicles, the average
AIC of the best fitting models was 615.5. All these fits are substantially worse than the
best fitting models when the data is correctly ordered, indicating that this model can be
falsified. When 95% of participants say that a bench is a member of Furniture, but only
15% of participants say that a bed is a member of Furniture, the model cannot fit these
data. It is interesting to note that the GCM fit the reordered Vehicles better than the
other two categories. This is likely due to the much more graded nature of the Vehicles
categorization responses as compared to Clothing or Furniture, where swapping the
categorization responses would have a more substantial effect.
Discussion
The GCM provided a very good fit of category membership ratings for a certain
commonly used natural language categories when supplied with category membership
data from WordNet and a similarity matrix from LSA. As shown in Figure 8 through
Figure 10, GCM predictions closely matched participant responses. Additionally, the
Falsifiability analysis indicated that results are due to a conjunction between participant
responses, objective measures of category membership and calculated measures of
concept-to-concept similarity as opposed to the model’s ability to fit any categorization
pattern.
Other models tested did not perform better than the GCM. While a prototype
model allowed for more categorization decisions to be modeled, the fits it provided
were worse than those provided by the GCM. Both the quantitative measures of fit
and a qualitative lack of consistency as to which parameter explains between-group
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variance makes the GCM a more useful model than the prototype model tested here.
Additionally, a GCM that including frequency information did not improve model fits.
Perhaps participants were familiar enough with each item presented (excepting go-carts)
that exemplar frequency does not impact their use in categorization decisions. While
word frequency is shown to have an effect on the response time of lexical decision tasks
(Emmanuel et al., 2010), participants performed the lexical decision task under tightly
controlled timing conditions while participants in Rock and Janoff-Bulmman’s (2010)
gave untimed responses. Perhaps even a relatively uncommon exemplar will come to
mind given enough time during a categorization task.
Since the dimensions relevant to natural language categorization are not known
a priori and could be infinite (Murphy & Medin, 1985), it is not possible to identify the
individual dimensions returned by MDS and orient the resulting coordinate points to
match up with those dimensions. As in other studies in which natural language categories
have been modeled ( e.g. Dry & Storms, 2009; Vanpaemel et al., 2010; Verbeemen et
al., 2007; Voorspoels et al., 2008) this is not a concern since the measure of interest is
how attention is distributed across dimensions rather than which individual dimensions
participants attended to. One way to allay any remaining concerns is to simulate
categorization decisions with stimuli of known dimensionality. The GCM could then
be fit to the simulated data using two different similarity spaces-one with unrotated
dimensions and one with rotated dimensions. If both results show a similar spread of
attention across dimensions, the current method is no cause for concern.
While this experiment has shown that mathematical models can successfully
handle natural language categories, the results of these models are inconclusive. The
parameters from the best fitting models of Clothing and Furniture category judgments
show that Liberals and those in Approach mode are more consistent than Conservatives
and those in avoidance mode. This presents an alternate interpretation of data that
indicate that Conservatives in avoidance mode are more exclusive in their categorization:
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if there is a greater than 50% chance that an item should be a category member, Liberals
and those in approach mode are more likely to include it. The parameters from the
best fitting model of Vehicle category judgments, however, indicate the opposite.
Conservatives in avoidance mode are more consistent than other participants.
Approach mode has been linked to political liberalism (e.g., Janoff-Bulman et
al., 2008) which may explain why Liberals are consistent categorizers of Clothing and
participants in approach mode are consistent categorizers of Furniture. It is surprising,
however, that Conservatives in avoidance mode appeared to be consistent categorizers
of Vehicles. Note that these data were analyzed very differently-averaging across
participants rather than stimuli and selecting out participants-than in Rock and JanoffBulman’s original analysis. Additionally, recall from the Literature Review that there is
dispute about whether approach mode broadens cognition relative to avoidance mode
(Friedman & Förster, 2005) or if an extreme mode in either direction narrows cognition
(P. A. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2008; P. Gable & Harmon-Jones, 2010; Price & HarmonJones, 2010).
It is noteworthy that Vehicles showed a much more graded category membership
profile than either Clothing or Furniture. This may be due to the nature of the categories,
although graded membership is typically found in all categories, especially man-made
artifacts (McCloskey & Glucksberg, 1978; Verheyen, Heussen, & Storms, 2011). On the
other hand, it may be due to the method for selecting stimuli for the experiment. Rock
and Janoff-Bulman tried to select items with a range of typicality, as judged by data
collected in Rosch in 1975. It is possible that items (such as ash-trays) have significantly
changed their typicality in the last 35 years, and these data are no longer useful for
selecting stimuli. New typicality data for Furniture and Vehicles will be collected in a
pilot study of Experiment 3.
Experiment 3 will extend these results by collecting category judgment decisions
for Rosch’s full lists of Furniture and Vehicles. Collecting a larger list of potential
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category members will assure a full range of category typicality (that is, items that
are clearly in the category, items that are clearly not in the category, and items that
are in-between). It will also provide many more degrees of freedom for each model,
since increasing the number of data points predicted does not increase the number of
parameters required by the model. Furthermore, item presentation will be computerized,
allowing for response time data to be collected and both modeled with the EBRW. The
techniques shown to best work for the GCM in Experiment 2 will be directly applied to
the EBRW in Experiment 3.
The techniques tested by modeling Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s data proved to be
successful in accounting for categorization performance. The results of these analyses,
however, should not be seen as a refutation of Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s results. In this
analysis responses were combined across participants (as opposed to across items, as in
the original analyses) and many participants were removed from the analysis to reduce
the modeling computations. The main goal of these analyses was to determine the best
method for fitting exemplar-based models of categorization to natural language data
when looking for between-group differences so that this method can be applied to data
collected in Experiment 3. Using one set of data to establish a model and method and
then applying that model to a second set of data helps assure that the model is fitting the
signal of the data and not the noise.
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Chapter 6
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiment 3 is a partial replication and extension of Rock & Janoff-Bulman
(2010). In Experiment 3, Liberal and Conservative participants in approach and
avoidance mode make categorization decisions for Clothing and an extended list of
Furniture and Vehicles while using a computerized method that allows for the collection
of response times. First, this extension increases the data point to parameter ratio,
providing more confidence in model results. Second, the collection of response times
allows for the EBRW to be fit to these data. The EBRW will be used to account for the
between-group differences. The EBRW may provide a better analog than the GCM for
the differences in cognition observed between people in approach and avoidance mode.
In addition to the main study, a norming study was conducted to collect typicality
and familiarity measures of the Furniture and Vehicles stimuli. Since Rosch (1975)
generated these lists more than 35 years ago, some items may have become more or
less typical in the intervening years or have become unfamiliar altogether. For example,
consider the disappearance of television cabinets over the past decade due to the
popularity of plasma televisions.
Method
Participants
Experiment 3 was run concurrently with Experiment 1 and participants were
recruited through the same methods (see Experiment 1 for details). Participants selfselected to participate in Experiment 1 or in this experiment, and received one extracredit point for participating. Over three semesters, 118 University of Massachusetts,
Amherst students participated in Experiment 3 (32 Males and 86 Females). Of these
118 participants, 64 were Liberals and 54 were Conservatives. 22 Liberals and 17
Conservatives were in the Approach condition, 21 Liberals and 19 Conservatives were
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in the Neutral condition, and 20 Liberals and 19 Conservatives were in the Avoidance
condition. One participant was not included in analyses due to computer error.
The norming study examining familiarity and typicality of the stimuli had 49
participants, drawn from the psychology department subject pool in the Fall of 2011.
There was no political orientation requirement to participate in the norming study.
Furthermore, none of the participants in who participated in the norming study also
participated in Experiment 1 or Experiment 3. Of these participants, 39 were Females and
10 were Males.
Materials
As previously mentioned, all categorization stimuli originated from Rosch (1975).
The category of Clothing was used as a practice set and the twelve-item subset tested by
Rock & Janoff-Bulman (2010) were used in the present study. For Vehicles and Furniture,
all items from Rosch’s list were used. All stimuli were presented on an eMac running the
Psychophysics Toolbox (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007; Pelli, 1997).
For the norming study, only the Vehicles and Furniture lists were tested.
Procedure
Experiment 3 had three phases: approach/avoidance induction, categorization,
and manipulation check. After reading and signing the consent form, participants sat
at a computer in an isolated room and performed the approach/avoidance induction as
described in Experiment 1. Participants in the approach condition were asked to list 10
movies to watch for a good time, participants in the avoidance condition were asked to
list 10 movies to not watch to avoid a bad time, and participants in the neutral condition
were asked to list 10 movies they had watched recently. All participants were given a
maximum of 5 minutes to complete this stage.
After listing movies, participants were asked to make a series of categorization
decisions. Each participant started with twelve Clothing categorization decisions in
order to familiarize them with the response format (since response time is critical to the
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EBRW). On each trial, participants were shown an item (e.g., “shirt,” “sweater,” “ring”)
and asked whether it was a member of the category “Clothing.” If participants believed
that a given item was in the category, they pressed the key “f,” otherwise they pressed the
key “j.” The presentation order of the twelve Clothing items was randomized for each
participant. After categorizing Clothing, participants were asked to make categorization
decisions about Vehicles and Furniture. Both the order of category presentation and the
order of item presentation were randomized across participants.
After making categorization decisions for all three sets of stimuli, participants
performed the manipulation check as described in Experiment 1. They were asked to
list three goals that they hoped to accomplish and three goals that they felt obligated to
accomplish. Response times to the former are believed to reflect the extent of approach
mode activation while response times to the later are believed to reflect the extent
of avoidance mode activation. The order of presentation of the two goals sets was
randomized across participants.
Participants in the norming study were shown the same lists of Furniture and
Vehicles as participants in Experiment 3. Instead of making categorization decisions for
each item, however, participants were asked to judge their familiarity with each item as
well as the item’s typicality as a member of its category. Each judgment was made on
a scale of 1 to 9, where 1 meant Not Familiar or Highly Atypical and 9 meant Highly
Familiar or Highly Typical. Participants were encouraged to use the whole range of
responses.
Results
Norming Study
The norming study aimed to answer two questions. First, how familiar were
participants with the natural language category members used as stimuli in this study?
Average familiarity ratings are listed in Appendix Table F8 and Table F9. Overall,
participants were very familiar with the stimuli in the study. On a scale of 1 (Not
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Familiar) to 9 (Very Familiar), the Furniture stimuli had a median familiarity rating of
8.79, IQR = 0.76 and the Vehicles stimuli had a median familiarity of 8.55, IQR = 0.72.
Items rated as unfamiliar were excluded from further analyses. Since both familiarity
distributions were highly negatively skewed, outliers were identified with the 1.5×IQR
method. For Furniture, this led to the exclusion of Davenport, Divan, Cedar Chest, Chaise
Lounge, Hassock and Hi-Fi. This method did not lead to the exclusion of any Vehicles
The second question addressed by the norming study was how contemporary
participants ranked the typicality of these stimuli as members of their natural language
categories. Average typicality ratings are listed in Appendix Table F8 and Table F9.
While Rosch (1975) had collected this data thirty-seven years ago, it was possible that
the typicality of some of these items had changed as the culture has evolved. Overall,
correlation was very high for Vehicles (r = -0.93) and high for Furniture (r = -0.72).
When unfamiliar items are removed from Furniture, correlation increased to r = -0.86.
Manipulation Check
As in Experiment 1, the measure of interest for the manipulation check was
the amount of time participants required before coming up with each of the three
goals they aspired to accomplish and each of the three goals they were required to
accomplish (Friedman & Förster, 2001). This was quantified by the average amount of
time participants required before they started typing each of their answers. Differences
in the time to start typing were tested by a 3(Mode) × 2(Question Type) mixed model
ANOVA, with Question Type as a within-subjects factor. First, there was a main effect
of Question Type. Participants were faster to start typing goals that they aspired to
achieve (x = 6.12, s = 4.24) than goals that they were required to achieve (x = 10.39,
s = 8.36), F(1,114) = 33.70, p < .001 . There was, however, neither a main effect of
Mode (F(1,114) = 0.35, p = .70) nor an interaction between Mode and Question Type
(F(2,116) = 0.64, p = .53).
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Categorization Performance
The goal of the present analyses is to identify between-group differences in
categorization decisions as reported by Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010). One participant
was removed from further analyses for answering “in-the-category” to 56 of 58 Furniture,
45 of 47 Vehicles and averaging 0.23 seconds per answer for Furniture. Average “in-thecategory” rates are given in Table 5. Complete “in-the-category” rates are provided for
each item in the Appendix Table F8 and Table F9.
Table 5
Average “In-the-category” Rates for Experiment 3
Condition
x
Liberals
Approach
.60
Neutral
.56
Avoidance
.61
Conservatives
Approach
.54
Neutral
.58
Avoidance
.65

s
.11
.09
.09
.08
.14
.08

In Experiment 3, participants were selected for their political identity and this
variable must therefore be treated as categorical. The inclusion of many category
items, however, means that typicality can now be treated as a continuous variable.
Categorization decisions were analyzed through a logistic regression, with Subject, Item
Typicality (as measured by the norming study), Mode (Approach, Neutral, Avoidance),
Political Identity (Liberal vs. Conservative), and their interactions entered as predictors of
category inclusion. The addition of these predictors significantly improved the predictions
of the model over a constant-only model from 59.3% correct to 77.7% correct,
χ2(12) = 4884.24, p < .001. The results of this test are given in Table 6.
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Table 6
Logistic Regression for Experiment 3
Source
1. Constant
2. Typicality
3. Subjects
4. Mode 1
5. Mode 2
6. Politics
7. Mode 1 × Typicality
8. Mode 2 × Typicality
9. Politics × Typicality
10. Mode 1 × Politics
11. Mode 2 × Politics
12. Mode 1 × Politics × Typicality
13. Mode 2 × Politics × Typicality

B
-3.37
0.76
0.00
-0.93
-1.02
-0.66
0.13
0.14
0.04
1.15
1.34
-0.08
-0.16

SE
0.18
0.04
0.01
0.27
0.27
0.27
0.05
0.05
0.05
0.39
0.38
0.08
0.07

Wald
345.06
475.35
0.01
12.13
14.73
5.99
5.92
7.54
0.60
8.77
12.14
1.11
4.96

df
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

p
< .001
< .001
.92
< .001
< .001
< .05
< .05
< .01
.44
< .01
< .001
.29
< .05

odds
0.03
2.13
1.00
0.40
0.36
0.52
1.13
1.15
1.04
3.17
3.81
0.92
0.85

Note: Mode 1 is Approach = 0, Avoidance = 1, Mode 2 is Approach = 0, Neutral = 1. Politics is
Liberal = 0, Conservative = 1.

In this analysis, all groups were compared to Liberals in approach mode. The
categorization rates predicted by the logistic regression are illustrated in Figure 11.
For Liberals in approach mode, each unit increase in Typicality increased the odds of
including an item in a given category (Source 2). For example, the regression equation
predicts that Liberals in approach mode will make an “in-the-category” judgment for
benches (typicality = 7.32) 89.6% of the time, pianos (typicality = 4.83) 56.8% of the
time, and sewing machines (typicality = 2.60) 19.6% of the time.
For Liberals in avoidance mode, there was an overall decrease in the odds of
including an item in a given category relative to Liberals in approach mode (Source
4), but this difference decreases as Typicality increases (Source 7). According to the
regression equation, Liberals in avoidance mode would make an “in-the-category”
judgment to benches 89.6% of the time, pianos 48.9% of the time and sewing machines
11.8% of the time. Note that for items of high typicality, the response probability is the
same but for items of lower typicality the probability is lower.
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Figure 11: Experiment 3 categorization rates by typicality as predicted by the logistic
regression
For Conservatives in approach mode, there was also an overall decrease in the
odds of including an item in a given category relative to Liberals in approach mode
(Source 6) and this decrease remains for all levels of Typicality (Source 9). According
to the regression equation, Conservatives in approach mode would make an “in-thecategory” judgment to benches 85.7% of the time, pianos 45.2% of the time and sewing
machines 12.3% of the time. Notice how the difference between Liberals in approach
mode and Conservatives in approach mode continues through the whole range of
typicality.
Finally, for Conservatives in avoidance mode, there was a smaller decrease in the
odds of including an item in the category relative to Liberals in approach mode (Sources
4, 6 and 10) than was found for Conservatives in approach mode (Source 6) or Liberals
in avoidance mode (Source 4). The difference in inclusion between Conservatives in
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avoidance mode and Liberals in approach mode decreases and eventually the effect
reverses as typicality increases (Sources 7 and 12). According to the regression equation,
Conservatives in avoidance mode would make an “in-the-category” judgment to benches
91.3% of the time, pianos 56.4% of the time and sewing machines 16.5% of the time.
Notice how Conservatives in avoidance mode are predicted to have a higher percentage
of “in-the-category” responses than Liberals in approach mode and this difference only
reverses at the lower levels of typicality.
Modeling
Participants’ categorization responses and response times were averaged within
Mode, Political Identity and category type (Furniture or Vehicles). Each was fit with the
EBRW. As with the GCM in Experiment 2, this required establishing a similarity space,
approximating category membership, and determining a set of exemplars to populate the
space.
Populating the Model with Exemplars
Unlike Experiment 2, participants in Experiment 3 made categorization decisions
for every natural language category member on Rosch’s (1975) Vehicles and Furniture
list. Therefore, no additional category members were added to the model to flesh out the
exemplar list. Similar to Experiment 2, however, up to three words associated with each
natural language category member were included as exemplars. Again, these associated
words were taken from the University of South Florida Word Association database
(Nelson et al., 1998). The full list of associated words can be seen in Appendix E.
Approximating Category Membership
As in Experiment 2, category membership was determined with WordNet
(Princeton University, 2010). Exemplars whose definition or taxonomy contained
the natural language category were considered to be category members for modeling
purposes.
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Determining Similarity Space
Experiment 3 used the same methods for determining a similarity space as
Experiment 2. First, overall similarity was calculated by inputting all exemplars into
LSA. The resulting similarity matrix was converted to distances with MDS. Nineteen
MDS solutions were constructed, having between 2 and 20 dimensions. The optimal
number of dimensions in the MDS solution was determined by correlating a constructed
typicality rating for each solution and the typicality ratings collected by Rosch (1975).
The optimal number of dimensions was identified by the “elbow” in the correlations,
where adding more dimensions did not significantly increase the correlation. See
Appendix Figure D2 for graphs of the MDS results. For both Furniture and Vehicles, the
optimal MDS solution had 10 dimensions. It is likely that these differ from the optimal
number of dimensions in Experiment 2 due to the increased number of exemplars used in
Experiment 3.
Generating the Data
Similarly to Experiment 2, data was averaged across participants within a Political
Identity, mode condition and category in order to generate proportional categorization
data. As there were no hypotheses about participants in the Neutral Mode condition, these
participants were excluded from the modeling analyses. Therefore, four data sets for were
generated for each category: Liberals in approach mode, Liberals in avoidance mode,
Conservatives in approach mode, and Conservatives in avoidance mode.
Fitting the EBRW
For each category, a fully constrained version of the EBRW was fit to all four
data sets. This model found the c, the set of w parameters, the A and B boundaries, and
the time parameters (α, k and μ) that best minimized the WSSD. This model was run
100 times with random starting points to guard against local minima, and the parameter
from the best fitting model were kept. Next, this model was run again 100 times with the
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best fitting parameters as its starting point, each permuted by normally distributed noise
(N(0,1)).
The next step in model fitting was to allow parameters to vary between groups.
The data were fit with models that allowed either c, all w weights, A, B or both A and B to
vary between groups. As in Experiment 2, parameters were allowed to vary one of three
ways: between Liberals and Conservatives, participants in Approach mode and Avoidance
mode, and Conservatives in Avoidance mode compared to all others. Because the logistic
regression analysis of the categorization performance showed that Liberals in approach
mode were the most inclusive categorizers, additional models were fit that allowed
these parameters to vary between Liberals in approach mode and all other participants.
Therefore, a total of 21 models were fit to account for between-group differences. Each
was fit 100 times using the best fitting parameters of the fully constrained model plus
normally distributed noise as starting points. The predictions of the best fitting models
can be found in the Appendix Table F10 and Table F11.
In Experiment 2, models were compared using AIC (Burnham & Anderson, 2002),
a theoretically motivated method of accounting for differences in model complexity using
log likelihood as a fit measure. Since the EBRW has no known likelihood fit measure
(Nosofsky & Stanton, 2005), models in Experiment 3 were compared with crossvalidation (Browne, 2000). Cross-validation fits the model to one set of data and tests it
on another. It is based on the assumption that a model that is too complex will fit noise in
the data and do a poor job of predicting new data. Cross-validation was implemented by
cycling through each to-be-categorized item, fitting each of the models with that item’s
categorization and RT data withheld, and then using the resulting parameters to predict
the withheld data. Each model’s cross-validation fit measure is the average of its WSSD
across all predicted data points.
The best fitting parameters for each of these models are given in the Appendix
Table F10 and Table F11. For Furniture, the best fitting model allowed A to vary between
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Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other participants. For participant categorization
decisions, and the best fitting model predictions, see Figure 12. For participant RT and
the best fitting model predictions, see Figure 13. In this best fitting model, AConAvo was
0.94 while AOther was 1.04, indicating that Conservatives in avoidance mode required less
information to make an “in-the-category” decision and were less consistent.
For Vehicles, the best fitting model allowed both A and B to vary between Liberals
and Conservatives. For participant categorization decisions and the best fitting model
predictions, see Figure 14. For participants RT and the best fitting model predictions, see
Figure 15. In this best fitting model, ALib was 21.44 and ACon was 23.09, while BLib was
32.05 and BCon was 29.51. Here, Liberals required less information than Conservatives
in order to make an “in-the-category” decision and more information than Conservatives
in order to make an “out-of-the-category” decision. Additionally, this places the A and B
farther apart for Liberals than Conservatives, indicating that there was more consistency
between Liberals than Conservatives in their categorization decisions.
Discussion
Experiment 3 showed between-group differences between Liberals and
Conservatives in approach and avoidance modes when categorizing Furniture and
Vehicles. When grouped across category, Liberals in approach mode showed higher
levels of category inclusion relative to Liberals in avoidance mode and Conservatives
in approach mode. Conservatives in avoidance mode, however, were similar in their
inclusivity to Liberals in approach mode. These differences were most notable at lower
levels of category typicality. When each category was modeled separately, the best
fitting model of Furniture allowed Conservatives in avoidance mode to have a smaller A
parameter than other participants and the best fitting model of Vehicles allowed Liberals
to have a smaller A parameter and a larger B parameter than Conservatives. While the
manipulation check did not find significant differences between participants in approach
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Figure 12: Furniture “in-the-category” judgments and modeling predictions for Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other
participants.
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Figure 12 continued
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Figure 12 continued
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Figure 13: Furniture RT and modeling predictions for Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other participants.
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Figure 13 continued
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Figure 13 continued
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Figure 14: Vehicle “in-the-category” judgments and modeling predictions for Liberals and Conservatives
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Figure 14 continued
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Figure 14 continued
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Figure 15: Vehicle RT and modeling predictions for Liberals and Conservatives
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Figure 15 continued

95

Figure 15 continued

and avoidance modes, between-group differences in inferential statistics and model
results indicate that the manipulation was effective.
To the extent that cognitive differences between people with different political
identities are due to personality differences, with Liberals more inclined to approach
state and Conservatives more inclined to avoidance state (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008),
these results are most in line with the findings of Markman et al. (Markman et al., 2005).
They found that decision boundaries are impacted by approach and avoidance state when
learning a new category. For both categories in Experiment 3, between-group differences
were best accounted for by changes in the decision criteria—how much information was
required before a categorization decision was made.
Even though both categories were best fit with between-group differences in
decision criteria, the group with the most inclusive criterion depended on the category
being modeled. That is, Furniture was best fit by a model allowing Conservatives in
avoidance mode had a smaller A than other participants, while Vehicles were best fit by
a model allowing Liberals to have a smaller A and a larger B than Conservatives. This
surprising result can be addressed by looking at the parameters of non-winning models.
For Furniture, look at the model that allowed the A and B parameters to vary between
Liberals in approach mode and all other participants. Liberals in approach mode were
best fit with a smaller A and a larger B, the same as their categorization decisions for
Vehicles. Now look at the Vehicles model that allowed the A and B parameters to vary
between Conservatives in avoidance mode and all other participants. Here, Conservatives
had a smaller A and an identical B, the same as their categorization decisions for
Furniture. This indicates that when Conservatives in avoidance mode are more inclusive
categorizers, they are also less consistent categorizers.
In sum, it seems like for both Furniture and Vehicles, Liberals in approach
mode and Conservatives in avoidance mode were the most inclusive categorizers. Since
Liberals are more likely to be in approach mode and Conservatives are more likely to be
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in Avoidance mode (Janoff-Bulman et al., 2008), perhaps participants in both of these
conditions were more receptive to their manipulation and were placed in a more extreme
mode. Price and Harmon-Jones (Price & Harmon-Jones, 2010) refer to this as “high
motivational intensity” and found related effects with approach motivation: that within a
given mode, “low motivational intensity” and “high motivational intensity” have different
effects on cognitive abilities. In contrast to the current results, however, they found that
high motivational intensity led to more exclusive categorization.
While the models overall did a good job of predicting participants’ categorization
decisions, some predictions were notably incorrect. Often this was due to a basic
disagreement between participants and WordNet (Princeton University, 2010) about
category membership. For example, while participants claimed to be familiar with a
buffet, obviously few were familiar with it as a piece of furniture and the model could not
accommodate giving a piece of furniture such a low probability of being in the category.
Additionally, the University of South Florida Free Association Norms (Nelson et al.,
1998) did not provide any associations for “buffet,” which would likely have been food
and have brought down the models association between Buffets and other exemplars of
Furniture.
As can be judged by the fit values in Appendix Table F10, the models of
Vehicles fit worse than the models of Furniture. The two items with the worst fit were
Ambulance and Skateboard. Ambulance was an odd instance. Almost all participants
thought an Ambulance was a Vehicle and WordNet agreed. Ambulance’s two closest
associations (other than self-similarity) were wheelchair and truck stop. These were both
not considered to be Vehicles by WordNet and these associations reduced the predicted
category inclusion rate to 73% for Liberals and 83% for Conservatives. Note that while
these values may not have the largest absolute error , they have the largest weighted
error because they have little variability according to the binomial distribution with an
observed category inclusion rate close to 100%.
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Skateboard had problems similar to Buffet in that there was a disagreement
between WordNet and participants. Inclusion rates ranged from 15% for Liberals in
avoidance mode to 38% for Liberals in approach mode. WordNet, however, indicates
that a skateboard is a vehicle. After its self-similarity, Skateboard was about equally
similar to Movie and Bike. Movies are not considered Vehicles by WordNet and Bikes
are considered Vehicles, so these exemplars likely canceled out each other in terms of
category inclusion. The model therefore predicts that Skateboards will be included in the
category 83% of the time for Liberals and 80% of the time for Conservatives.
It is unclear what the best step is to improve model fits. In a number of instances,
a fundamental disagreement between participants and WordNet regarding category
membership causes the model to make poor predictions. While an item’s WordNet
category membership is obviously not the only component of the categorization decision,
it is a large factor because an item’s self-similarity always has the most influence on the
model’s prediction. One way to reduce the impact of WordNet’s category membership for
the to-be-categorized item is to manually reduce self-similarity. Highly typical category
members will remain similar to other category members, keeping their predicted category
inclusion rates high. Atypical members would not be similar to other category members
and this would drive down their category inclusion rates. This would help the fits for
items like Buffet and Skateboard, but not for items like Ambulance.

98

Chapter 7
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The purpose of the dissertation was to use exemplar-based models of
categorization to explain the between-group differences observed by Rock and JanoffBulman’s (2010). Experiment 1 the EBRW was fit to the categorization decisions
of Conservative and Liberal participants in approach and avoidance modes using
experimenter-designed stimuli. The stimuli in Experiment 1 had clearly defined
dimensions that could be easily accounted for by mathematical models of categorization.
In Experiment 2 the GCM was fit to the data from Rock and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010)
Experiment 1. In Experiment 3, the EBRW was fit to data that replicated Rock and
Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) for two categories and extended it by collecting RTs and adding
stimuli to each of the two categories.
The Effect of Mode and Political Identity
Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010) showed that when participants were put into
avoidance mode, the most politically conservative participants were the most exclusive
categorizers of natural language stimuli. Approach mode had no significant effect on the
inclusivity of participants who made categorization decisions about natural language
stimuli. Based on these results, one would expect that Conservatives in avoidance mode
would be the most exclusive categorizers of artificial stimuli in Experiment 1 and of
natural language categories in Experiment 3.
In Experiment 1, Liberals and Conservatives were placed into approach or
avoidance mode while deciding whether artificial stimuli were members of a newly
learned category. Experiment 1 showed that Liberals were more inclusive categorizers
than Conservatives when making decisions about these artificial stimuli. Specifically,
an ANOVA showed more inclusive categorization for Liberals in approach mode than
Conservatives in approach mode, while a Signal Detection analysis showed that Liberals
in avoidance mode had a more inclusive criterion than Conservatives in avoidance mode.
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In Experiment 3, Liberals and Conservatives were placed into approach or avoidance
mode while deciding whether natural language stimuli were members of natural language
categories. Experiment 3 showed that Liberals in approach mode were the most inclusive
categorizers of these natural language stimuli, followed closely by Conservatives in
avoidance mode. At high levels of category typicality Conservatives in avoidance mode
became more inclusive categorizers of these natural language stimuli than Liberals in
approach mode. These results are surprising. Based on Rock and Janoff-Bulman (2010),
one would expect that Conservatives in avoidance mode would be the most exclusive
categorizers in both studies.
In sum, the results of the behavioral data are inconsistent across experiments.
Overall, Liberals appear more inclusive categorizers than Conservatives in Experiment
1, while both Liberals in approach mode and Conservatives in avoidance mode were
highly inclusive categorizers in Experiment 3. As discussed throughout this dissertation,
inclusive categorization can come about through differences in a number of components
of the categorization process. Differences in these components could produce different
effects depending on the stimuli. If the observed between-group differences were due
to differences in consistency of categorization, then the apparent inclusivity of their
categorization would be dependent on the typicality of the items being categorized. In
Experiment 1, the majority of the jellyfish (8 of 13) were clearly category members.
Under these circumstances a more consistent categorizer would appear to be a more
inclusive categorizer – more consistently including all of the typical category members.
In Experiment 3, there was a greater range of typicality within each category and under
these conditions being a consistent categorizer might not appear to be an inclusive
categorizer. On the other hand, if being a Liberal or being in approach mode broadened
a categorizer’s spread of attention across dimensions, this may make them more likely
to include atypical jellyfish since these jellyfish are unlikely to be atypical across all
dimensions due to their creation process. Again, the effect of focused attention is harder
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to predict for natural language categories. Perhaps focusing on dimension such as “does
it carry people” for Vehicles or “can you buy it in a Furniture store” for Furniture may
make people with focused attention appear to be more inclusive categorizers.
To address these issues, Experiment 2 used the GCM to model data from Rock
and Janoff-Bulman’s (2010) Experiment 1, in which Liberals and Conservatives were
placed into approach or avoidance mode while deciding whether natural language stimuli
were members of natural language categories. Each of the three categories modeled
indicated that differences in inclusiveness between groups were due to differences in
γ, a parameter representing the consistency of responses to items of uncertain category
membership. Participants in approach mode had a higher γ than participants in avoidance
mode when categorizing Clothing, Liberal participants had a higher γ than Conservatives
when categorizing Furniture, and Conservative participants in avoidance mode had a
higher γ than all other participants when categorizing Vehicles.
Experiments 1 and 3 used the EBRW, which does not have a γ parameter, to
model the data. The distance between the A and B parameters in the EBRW would be
roughly analogous to γ in the GCM. Increasing the distance between A and B effectively
increases the number of exemplars sampled before a decision is made and decreases
the chance that the decision will be impacted by an improbable sampling of exemplars
from the less-likely category. Therefore, a large distance between A and B means that
the model predicts a consistent categorization decision of the most likely category
membership. The absolute values of A and B determine the model’s inclusiveness. As A
moves closer or B moves farther away from the zero-knowledge point, the model predicts
more inclusive categorization.
Experiment 1 showed that Conservatives in avoidance mode had a larger c
parameter than all other participants. This indicates that Conservatives in avoidance mode
required items had to be a closer match to trained category members before they judged
them to be category members. Experiment 3 showed that Conservatives in avoidance

101

mode had a smaller A parameter than all other participants when categorizing Furniture.
This indicates that Conservatives in avoidance mode were more inclusive but less
consistent categorizers than all other participants. Experiment 3 also showed that Liberals
had a smaller A parameter and a larger B parameter than Conservatives when categorizing
Vehicles. This indicates that Liberals were more inclusive than Conservatives. Liberals
were also the more consistent categorizers, since the distance between A and B is greater
for Liberals than Conservatives, indicating that Liberals required more information than
Conservatives in order to reach a decision.
The exemplar-based models of categorization fit in Experiments 2 and 3
identified between-group differences as originating in the A and B parameters or the γ
parameter. These parameters are all associated with the decision-making components of
the categorization process. That is, they determine how people turn an item’s similarity
to a set of exemplars into a categorization decision, rather than how they scale the
similarity between exemplars. These results are consistent with those of Markman et
al. (2005), who found that being in different modes during a category learning task
affected how participants established their decision boundaries. Modeling results for
Experiment 1, however, identified between-group differences as originating in the c
parameter, which is associated with the item-to-exemplar comparison component of
categorization. It is possible that the nature of the stimuli interact with the observed effect
of the categorization process. That is, approach and avoidance mode could impact the
perception of items learned in the laboratory, while at the same time impacting decision
making about previously known items.
Previous attempts to account for the effects of context on categorization have
focused on how people spread attention across dimensions ( e.g., Lin & Murphy, 1997;
Spalding & Murphy, 1996). The modeling results presented here indicate that researchers
should extend their investigations beyond how attention is distributed across dimensions
to look at other aspects of the categorization process, such as the amount of information
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required to make a categorization decision and the impact of context on the consistency
of categorization responses. For example, Lamberts (1995; 1998) has shown that making
categorization decisions under a time-constraint affects how information accumulates.
There may be between-group differences in this effect. Other types of ephemeral and
persistent contexts may also affect decision criteria.
Different analyses—ANOVA, Signal Detection, and modeling—of data from
Experiments 1 and 3 yielded different results about whether the manipulations were
successful. For reasons explained in the Discussion of each experiment, these different
results indicate that the manipulation check used was not sufficiently sensitive to
differences between participants in approach mode and participants in avoidance mode.
Shortly after the current experiments were designed, a line-bisection task was proposed
as an alternate manipulation check and shown to correlate with neuropsychological
evidence associated with differences in mode (Nash, McGregor, & Inzlicht, 2010). Future
experiments may benefit from including multiple manipulation checks that have been
shown to be sensitive to approach/avoidance mode manipulation, such as line-bisection.
Modeling Natural Language Categories
Previous attempts to model natural language categories have used subjective
measures of generating a similarity space and have not investigated between-group
differences (e.g., Smits et al., 2002; Voorspoels et al., 2008). The present methods
were designed to develop a more objective way of fitting exemplar-based models of
categorization to natural language categories than has previously been used, allowing
them to account for between-group differences in categorization decisions. Three major
challenges needed to be overcome: defining a similarity space, determining category
membership for exemplars, and populating the similarity space. In Experiments 2 and
3, LSA (Landauer et al., 1998) was used to define the similarity space of the natural
language categories, WordNet (Princeton University, 2010) was used to define category
membership of exemplars, and the University of South Florida Word Association
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database (Nelson et al., 1998) was used to populate the similarity space of the natural
language categories with exemplars. These methods provided a successful framework for
modeling between-group differences in natural language categorization.
Future attempts to fit exemplar-based models to natural language categories
could use other methods. For example, similarity metrics based on WordNet taxonomies
could be used to define the similarity space of natural language categories rather than
LSA (for a discussion of these metrics, see Budanitsky & Hirst, 2006). Unlike LSA, in
which words are defined by the context in which they are found, WordNet uses synonyms
to define words. WordNet therefore distinguishes between the various meanings of
polysemous words where LSA does not. For example, in WordNet the Buffet of dining
room furniture is unrelated to the Buffet of self-service restaurants, so concepts similar
to BuffetRestaurant will not affect the similarity calculations of BuffetFurniture. This may have
a positive or a negative impact for modeling categorization decisions, depending on
whether homonyms and associated words impact the categorization decision.
Items from the University of South Florida Word Association database (Nelson
et al., 1998) were included as exemplars in the similarity space of a to-be-categorized
item only if those items were of the same taxonomic level as the to-be-categorized item
in Experiments 2 and 3. For example, drawers and wood were not included as exemplars
in the similarity space when modeling participants’ decisions about whether a desk is
Furniture even though these two items are associated with desks in the database. Model
fits might be improved by including items as exemplars regardless of their taxonomic
level. Sometimes items from different taxonomic levels that are associated with an
item appear in an exemplar-based model as features that the item has in common with
exemplars of a category. For example, a desk can be similar to exemplars of Furniture,
like chairs and tables, because they are all made of wood. If these features were
exemplars themselves, their category membership would need to be determined. The
WordNet definition of wood does not mention Furniture, so the exemplar wood would
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not be included in the category Furniture if WordNet is used to define the category
membership of exemplars. The EBRW would then lower the probability that a desk
would be included in the category Furniture based on its similarity to wood. On the other
hand, the WordNet definition of drawers does mention Furniture, so the exemplar drawers
would be included in the category Furniture. The EBRW would then raise the probability
that a desk would be included in the category Furniture based on its similarity to drawers.
Future efforts to model natural language categorization decisions could benefit
from trying to estimate parameter values from other measures. For example, bias could be
estimated by a signal detection task unrelated to the categorization decision. This estimate
could stand in for the distance between the A and B boundaries, so only one parameter
would have to be fit to the data. Similarly, the score from a recognition memory test could
be used to estimate the c parameter. Estimating these parameters from other sources
would have two benefits. First, it would increase the meaningfulness of the model by
showing that the parameters reflect measureable psychological processes. Second, from
a modeling standpoint, it would decrease the complexity of the model and reduce the
likelihood that the model is fitting noise in the data rather than true underlying behavior.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the present studies identified differences in the categorization
decisions of Liberals and Conservatives in approach and avoidance modes, but these
differences were inconsistent across studies and categories. These categorization
decisions were fit with exemplar-based models of categorization. To do so required
developing objective methods of generating model components. Liberals and those in
approach mode may have a more inclusive category criterion but are most likely more
consistent categorizers compared to Conservatives and those in avoidance mode. The
effect of differences in consistency on category inclusiveness, however, depend on the
category structure being tested.
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Appendix A
PRE-SCREENING SURVEY QUESTIONS
1. Where would you place yourself politically on the following two scales?
a. 1 (very liberal) – 4 (neither) – 7 (very conservative)
b. 1 (strong Democrat) – 4 (neither) – 7 (strong Republican)
2. How much do you tend to like or dislike political conservatives?
a. 1(dislike extremely) – 7 (like extremely)
3. How much do you tend to like or dislike political liberals?
a. 1(dislike extremely) – 7 (like extremely)
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Appendix B
INSTRUCTIONS FOR APPROACH/AVOIDANCE MANIPULATION IN
EXPERIMENTS 1 AND 3
1. Approach: We are interested in finding movies that are generally considered fun
to watch. Please list 10 movies you would recommend a friend TO SEE if they wanted to
have a good time.
2. Neutral: We are interested in finding movies that are generally well known.
Please list 10 movies that you have seen recently.
3. Avoidance: We are interested in finding movies that are generally considered
unpleasant to watch. Please list 10 movies you would recommend a friend NOT TO SEE
if they wanted prevent a bad time.
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Appendix C
STIMULI FOR EXPERIMENT 1
Table C1.
Stimuli Generation Values for Experiment 1
Stimulus Space

Category Prototype Values

Dimensions

Min

Max

Mean

SD

Organ color (rgb = [x 0 0])

85

205

145

7.5

Bell diameter (400x by 200x pixels)

.6

1.5

1.05

.05

Bell thickness (line = x pt weight)

1

11.8

6.45

.6

Tentacle length (segment = x pixels)

16

34

25

1

Table C2.
Stimuli Values for Experiment 1
Organ Color

Bell Diameter

Bell Thickness

Tentacle Length

High 1

0.99

24.90

6.68

133.92

High 2

1.03

26.43

7.10

149.54

High 3

1.16

25.29

5.85

145.24

Medium 1

1.07

23.44

6.72

149.82

Medium 2

1.11

24.51

6.29

143.42

Medium 3

1.05

25.76

5.49

138.99

Atypical 1

1.10

26.68

3.34

149.61

Atypical 2

1.00

23.89

7.17

123.07

Atypical 3

1.13

23.83

7.04

142.03

Non-category 1

0.90

30.59

2.32

204.88

Non-category 2

0.89

16.94

7.85

153.59

Non-category 3

1.14

22.51

2.65

123.53

Non-category 4

0.65

25.23

6.51

94.37

Non-category 5

0.75

29.26

6.80

159.42

Non-category 6

1.48

16.58

6.30

132.58

Non-category 7

1.26

25.79

6.17

88.19

Note. Stimuli in boldface were used during training
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Figure D1: Dimensional analysis for Experiment 2

DIMENSIONAL ANALYSIS FOR MULTIDIMENSIONAL SCALING

Appendix D
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Figure D2: Dimensional analysis for Experiment 3

Appendix E
WORD ASSOCIATIONS FOR NATURAL LANGUAGE CATEGORY MODELING
Experiment 2
Carpenter’s Tools
1. Drill
a. Hole
b. Teeth
2. Ladder
a. Roof
b. Stair
c. Paint
3. Bolt
a. Door
4. Saw
a. Tree
5. Rag
a. Towel
b. Dish
c. Bum
6. Scissors
a. Paper
7. Screwdriver
a. Vodka
b. Orange Juice
8. Blueprint
a. House
9. Hinge
a. Gate

Clothing
1. Shirt
a. Shorts
2. Cane
a. Crutch
b. Walker
3. Purse
a. Money
b. Wallet
c. Girl
4. Sweater
a. Winter
5. Ring
a. Marriage
6. Pants
a. Man
7. Bracelet
a. Wrist
8. Pajamas
a. Bed
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Furniture
1. Drapes
a. Window
b. House
c. Wall
2. Desk
a. Pen
b. Clerk
c. Paper
3. Ashtray
a. Cigarette
b. Smoke
c. Car
4. Lamp
a. Light

Vehicles
1. Car
a. Money
b. Race
c. Road
2. Jet
a. Airline
3. Camel
a. Desert
b. Water
4. Yacht
a. Ocean
b. Sea
5. Train
a. Track
b. Station
6. Tractor
a. Farm
b. Grass
c. Dirt
7. Bus
a. People
b. City
c. Station
8. Elevator
a. Stair
b. Building
c. Box
9. Airplane
a. Airport
b. Movie
c. Bird

Weapons
1. Knife
a. Fork
b. Spoon
2. Arrow
a. Indian
b. Target
3. Bomb
a. War
b. Death
4. Brick
a. Wood
5. Shoe
a. Sock
6. Axe
a. Tree
b. Saw
7. Sword
a. Sheath
b. Shield
8. Screwdriver
a. Screw
b. Vodka
c. Wrench

112

Experiment 3
Furniture
1. Sofa
a. Sleep
b. Sex
c. Rest
2. Couch
a. Potato
3. Table
a. Cloth
b. Setting
4. Desk
a. Work
b. Paper
c. Pen
5. Bureau
a. Investigation
b. Government
c. Organization
6. Chest
a. Muscle
b. Breast
c. Heart
7. Vanity
a. Beauty
b. Pride
c. Singer
8. Lounge
a. Beer
b. Drink
c. Liquor
9. Cabinet
a. Plate
b. Book
10. Bench
a. Baseball
b. Basketball
c. Football
11. Stool
a. Feces
b. Foot
c. Sample

12. Drawer
a. Clothes
13. Piano
a. Music
b. Organ
c. Guitar
14. Cushion
a. Pin
15. Cupboard
a. Cup
b. Dishes
c. Food
16. Stereo
a. Radio
b. CD
c. Cassette
17. Mirror
a. Reflection
18. Television
a. Commercial
b. Movie
c. Video
19. Bar
a. Drink
b. Alcohol
c. Grill
20. Shelf
a. Awards
b. Life
c. Room
21. Rug
a. Carpet
b. Floor
c. Mat
22. Pillow
a. Head
b. Blanket
c. Sheet
23. Radio
a. Tape
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24. Counter
a. Sink
b. Clerk
25. Drape
a. Window
b. House
c. Wall
26. Refrigerator
a. Microwave
27. Closet
a. Hanger
28. Vase
a. Flower
b. Rose
c. Plant
29. Ashtray
a. Cigarette
b. Ash
c. Car
30. Fan
a. Air
31. Telephone
a. Answering machine

Experiment 3
Vehicles
1. Truck
a. Road
b. Truck stop
2. Car
a. Money
b. Race
3. Bus
a. Bus stop
b. City
c. Station
4. Jeep
a. Army
b. Mud
5. Ambulance
a. Hospital
6. Motorcycle
a. Helmet
b. Mouse
7. Van
a. Hippie
b. Family
8. Train
a. Track
9. Bicycle
a. Shop
10. Carriage
a. House
11. Airplane
a. Airport
b. Bird
c. Movie
12. Bike
a. Rack
b. Lock
c. Trail
13. Boat
a. Water
b. Ocean
c. Fish
14. Ship
a. Sea
b. Yard

15. Tractor
a. Farm
b. Grass
c. Dirt
16. Wagon
a. Cowboy
17. Subway
a. Token
18. Trailer
a. Park
19. Cart
a. Groceries
b. Basket
c. Supermarket
20. Yacht
a. Club
21. Tank
a. Gas
22. Tricycle
a. Children
b. Baby
23. Canoe
a. Indian
b. River
24. Raft
a. Lake
b. Pool
c. Beach
25. Submarine
a. Sandwich
b. Navy
26. Horse
a. Cow
b. Shit
c. Dog
27. Rocket
a. Space
b. Moon
c. Sky
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28. Skates
a. Ice
b. Rink
c. Rat
29. Camel
a. Desert
b. Cigarette
c. Egypt
30. Feet
a. Shoes
b. Hands
c. Inch
31. Skis
a. Snow
b. Mountain
c. Resort
32. Elevator
a. Stair
b. Escalator
c. Building

Appendix F
RESULTS FROM EXPERIMENTS
Experiment 1
Table F1.
Category Inclusion Rates by Politics and Mode for Female Participants
Group

High

Medium

Atypical

Non-category

Approach

.83(.04)

.84(.04)

.68(.04)

.18(.03)

Neutral

.83(.03)

.84(.04)

.74(.04)

.19(.03)

Avoidance

.88(.03)

.90(.03)

.77(.03)

.21(.02)

Approach

.75(.04)

.74(.04)

.66(.04)

.18(.03)

Neutral

.86(.04)

.87(.04)

.74(.04)

.26(.03)

Avoidance

.87(.05)

.87(.05)

.73(.06)

.12(.04)

Liberal

Conservative

Table F2.
Category Inclusion Rates by Politics and Mode for Male Participants
Group

High

Medium

Atypical

Non-category

Approach

.86(.06)

.92(.06)

.82(.06)

.21(.05)

Neutral

.92(.07)

.92(.07)

.65(.77)

.10(.06)

Avoidance

.91(.06)

.94(.06)

.81(.06)

.23(.05)

Approach

.91(.06)

.87(.06)

.72(.06)

.20(.05)

Neutral

.97(.06)

.99(.06)

.71(.07)

.16(.05)

Avoidance

.89(.06)

.91(.06)

.74(.07)

.20(.05)

Liberal

Conservative
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1.28 (1.83)

1.56 (1.05)

Neutral

Avoidance

0.66 (0.40)

0.59 (0.17)

0.67 (0.43)
40.38 (332.25)

6.31 (12.13)

3.65 (18.85)

9.01 (28.89)

5.64 (15.71)

2.75 (41.99)

A

2.22 (35.14)

μ
k

43.03 (89.37)

31.06 (73.44)

38.70 (148.14)

49.66 (128.91)

331.81 (538.09)

408.74 (501.56)

81.77 (503.18)

7.31 (442.74)

50.76 (529.97)

68.68 (199.23)

99.57 (73.42)

87.38 (121.01)

72.09 (96.82)

73.38 (95.94)

WSSD

0.12 (503.18) 64.80 (182.68)

0.54 (4.69)

4.00 (8.23)

2.51 (6.87)

5.62 (15.25)

132.32 (344.06) 128.34 (6667.11) 0.33 (5.54)

α

2.89 (322.64) 62.56 (294.25)

3.01 (21.97)

4.75 (16.32)

1.51 (10.92)

2.31 (7.29)

B

Note. Parameters c, wrange, A, B, and α were each subjected to a separate 3 (Mode) × 2 (Politics) between subjects ANOVA. Due to the skewed
distribution of these parameters (aside from wrange which was contstrained), outliers in each parameter (as identified by the 1.5IQR method) were
removed and the remaining parameters were logistically transformed. For c, there was no effect of Mode (F(2,78) = 0.84, p = .46), Politics (F(1,78)
= 0.99, p = .32), nor their interaction (F(2,78) = 0.54, p = .59). For wrange, there was no effect of Mode (F(2,85) = 0.45, p = .64), Politics (F(1,85) =
2.03, p = .16) nor their interaction (F(2,85) = 0.58, p = .56). For A, there was no effect of Mode (F(2,72) = 0.34, p = .72), Politics (F(1,72) = 0.18, p
= .68 nor their interaction (F(2,72) = 0.91, p = .41). For B, there was no effect of Mode (F(2,70) = 0.11, p = .90), Politics (F(1,70) = 1.97, p = .17),
nor their interaction (F(2,70) = 0.42, p = .66). For α, there was no effect of Mode (F(2,75) = 0.43, p = .65), Politics (F(1,75) = 0.01, p = .91) nor
their interaction (F(2,75) = 1.05, p = .36). For μ, there was no effect of Mode (F(1,74) = 0.11, p = .89), Politics (F(1,74) = 0.49, p = .49) nor their
interaction (F(2,74) = 0.79, p = .46). Finally, for k, there was no effect of Mode (F(1,73) = 0.27, p = .76), Politics (F(1,73) = 1.16, p = .28) nor their
interaction (F(2,73) = 1.81, p = .17).

1.56 (1.33)

Approach

Conservative

1.09 (1.58)

0.76 (0.25)

0.72 (0.37)

0.76 (1.33)

Neutral

Avoidance

wrange
0.73 (0.30)

c

1.28 (1.64)

Approach

Liberal

Group

Table F3.
Median (and IQR) Best Fitting Individual EBRW Parameters for Participants Who Learned the Category Structure
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Constrained
c
Liberals
Conservatives
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
w
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
A
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
B
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
0.38
0.40
0.39

0.40
0.42
0.44

0.51

0.37

0.62

0.44

0.83

0.24

0.51

0.23
0.47
0.21
0.51

3.92

17.21

6.78

19.30

27.02

13.80
11.93
9.31
11.96

43.31

41.41

55.68

6.89

7.24

0.43
0.45

5.35

A
27.37

0.45

wrange
0.45

0.48

0.24

0.22

0.30

0.58

1.20

0.65
0.92
0.48
0.84

c
0.36

1.97

1.30

2.39
1.83
3.05
3.11

3.61

2.56

2.73

6.27

6.20

5.32

2.40

2.32

2.03

B
3.78

106 × 2.45

104 × 2.31

105 × 1.75

107 × 3.91

107 × 5.01

105 × 6.22

216.89

1149.76

1880.81

108 × 9.00

108 × 3.90

107 × 3.30

α
578.98

10-5 × 4.32

10-4 × 3.77

10-4 × 2.11

10-7 × 1.36

10-7 × 3.72

10-5 × 2.16

0.008

0.0017

0.0008

10-8 × 4.15

10-8 × 9.10

10-6 × 1.66

k
0.007

395.18

654.03

589.66

602.11

615.91

629.16

584.66

628.78

659.86

532.52

560.51

557.64

µ
670.69

Table F4.
Best Fitting Parameters and Mean Cross-Validation WSSD Values for Averaged Data

349.03

275.91

314.95

349.64

346.07

376.25

378.29

380.82

397.80

98.75

122.29

220.29

WSSD
410.10
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A&B
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others

Table F4 continued
wrange
0.40
0.44
0.42

c

0.63

0.76

0.71

B
2.42
1.78
2.07
1.74
1.53
2.20

A
6.49
6.75
5.00
4.46
4.89
5.37

105 × 1.74

106 × 3.73

105 × 1.73

α

10-4 × 3.65

10-5 × 1.86

10-4 × 2.25

k

454.95

514.48

582.41

µ

431.57

390.80

334.93

WSSD

Experiment 2
Table F5.
Best Fitting Parameters and AIC Values for Clothing
Constrained
c
Liberals
Conservatives
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
wvar
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
γ
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others

c
31.63
31.12
32.06
31.88
31.43
34.90
30.55
31.78
32.13
31.79

wrange
0.80

γ
4.26

AIC
87.79

0.80

4.26

89.63

0.80

4.26

89.76

0.80

4.22

87.64

4.26

93.12

4.26

91.32

4.14

92.05

0.81
0.80
0.78
0.81
0.69
0.81

31.63

0.80

31.08

0.80

31.67

0.80
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4.19
4.33
5.06
4.03
4.31
4.23

89.72
86.85
89.76

Table F6.
Best Fitting Parameters and AIC Values for Furniture
Constrained
c
Liberals
Conservatives
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
wvar
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
γ
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others

c
19.25
20.23
18.59
21.10
21.59
18.94
19.94
23.38
18.07
19.82

wrange
0.46

γ
3.90

AIC
215.31

0.51

4.10

216.19

0.53

3.63

225.93

0.44

3.94

222.99

3.43

243.41

4.36

241.91

3.74

241.22

0.45
0.52
0.63
0.31
0.44
0.47

20.14

0.51

17.72

0.39

17.82

0.38

4.33
3.58
3.99
4.41
4.49
4.07
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215.01
218.24
227.39

Table F7.
Best Fitting Parameters and AIC Values for Vehicles
Constrained
c
Liberals
Conservatives
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
wvar
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
γ
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others

c
6.33
6.81
6.39
6.94
6.32
5.92
6.59
6.63
7.96
6.48

wrange
0.60

γ
11.98

AIC
311.92

0.62

12.07

314.96

0.61

11.77

314.35

0.60

12.18

317.20

11.73

333.42

9.27

334.46

11.08

335.12

0.61
0.63
0.63
0.57
0.68
0.51

6.91

0.59

6.87

0.60

8.05

0.52

11.82
10.25
11.78
10.42
9.97
8.05
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315.06
316.57
304.95

122
8.96
8.38

6.89

8.32

8.21

8.70

easy chair

dresser

rocking chair

coffee table

8.98

3.47

7.68

6.74

6.28

divan

chest

cedar chest

vanity

8.47

8.00

2.87

8.47

bed

bureau

8.60

desk

davenport

8.96

7.51

chest of
drawers

7.11

6.81

8.40

3.15

2.55

8.94

8.15

8.26

7.36

8.04

rocker

love seat

8.79

8.87

7.17

8.96

9.00

8.98

9.00

8.94

sofa

8.98

couch

8.98

chair

Familiarity

table

Typicality

Stimulus

Norming Study

0.90

0.95

0.95

0.57

0.52

0.95

1.00

0.95

0.95

1.00

1.00

0.95

0.95

0.95

1.00

0.95

1.00

1.00

1.00

Liberal
Approach

0.71

0.90

0.90

0.29

0.43

0.95

1.00

0.95

1.00

0.95

1.00

0.95

1.00

1.00

0.95

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

Liberal
Neutral

Categorization Study

Table F8.
Typicality, Familiarity and “In-The-Category” Judgments for Furniture

Experiment 3

0.90

0.95

0.95

0.30

0.45

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.95

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.95

0.95

1.00

Liberal Avoid

0.76

0.88

0.88

0.47

0.18

0.65

0.94

1.00

0.94

1.00

0.76

1.00

0.88

1.00

0.94

1.00

0.94

1.00

0.94

Conservative
Approach

0.74

0.84

0.79

0.16

0.26

0.95

0.95

1.00

0.95

1.00

0.89

1.00

1.00

0.95

1.00

0.95

0.95

1.00

1.00

Conservative
Neutral

0.89

0.94

1.00

0.33

0.44

0.94

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.94

0.94

1.00

0.94

1.00

1.00

1.00

0.89

1.00

1.00

Conservative
Avoid
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3.57

5.83

4.85

4.72

television

bar

5.96

cupboard

stereo

2.79

hi-fi

mirror

4.83

magazine rack

7.17

drawers

4.89

2.60

hassock

6.00

7.98

stool

cushion

6.11

lamp

piano

7.32

6.47

china closet

2.91

6.83

cabinet

bench

6.72

footstool

buffet

4.91

6.64

5.11

lounge

chaise lounge

7.70

bookcase

ottoman

Typicality

Stimulus

Norming Study

Table F8 continued

8.64

8.89

8.89

8.79

8.57

6.57

8.13

8.72

8.81

8.85

2.30

8.89

8.72

7.04

8.94

7.79

8.89

8.62

7.13

5.55

8.02

8.64

Familiarity

0.52

0.00

0.29

0.05

0.81

0.10

0.43

0.57

0.38

0.86

0.29

0.95

0.43

0.33

0.95

0.76

0.76

0.95

0.90

0.71

0.90

0.95

Liberal
Approach

0.43

0.24

0.33

0.05

0.71

0.05

0.29

0.43

0.33

0.90

0.52

1.00

0.24

0.33

1.00

0.71

0.95

0.95

0.95

0.76

0.76

0.95

Liberal
Neutral

Categorization Study

0.65

0.25

0.40

0.05

0.65

0.10

0.50

0.45

0.40

0.80

0.35

0.95

0.40

0.30

0.95

0.95

0.85

1.00

0.90

0.90

0.75

0.90

Liberal Avoid

0.59

0.18

0.47

0.00

0.53

0.00

0.53

0.47

0.24

0.82

0.29

0.82

0.29

0.24

0.94

0.71

0.71

0.82

0.76

0.65

0.76

0.82

Conservative
Approach

0.63

0.42

0.53

0.11

0.63

0.11

0.63

0.53

0.47

0.74

0.21

0.89

0.53

0.11

0.89

0.79

0.74

0.95

0.84

0.47

0.58

0.95

Conservative
Neutral

0.78

0.39

0.28

0.11

0.78

0.17

0.61

0.33

0.50

0.94

0.50

1.00

0.56

0.28

1.00

0.89

0.89

1.00

0.89

0.83

0.83

0.94

Conservative
Avoid
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8.94
8.91

5.51

rug

3.83

3.23

fan

telephone

4.62

closet

4.06

3.85

picture

2.28

4.11

refrigerator

ashtray

4.32

drapes

vase

5.87

4.70

8.98

4.55

stove

counter

8.49

sewing machine 2.60

clock

8.87

3.21

radio

8.96

8.79

8.26

8.70

8.98

8.96

8.96

7.98

8.96

8.94

8.81

4.06

4.32

pillow

wastebasket

8.81

7.13

shelf

Familiarity

Typicality

Stimulus

Norming Study

Table F8 continued

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.10

0.43

0.05

0.29

0.24

0.14

0.57

0.33

0.10

0.05

0.24

0.19

0.24

0.67

Liberal
Approach

0.00

0.00

0.05

0.00

0.29

0.00

0.33

0.05

0.10

0.43

0.29

0.00

0.00

0.14

0.00

0.24

0.71

Liberal
Neutral

Categorization Study

0.05

0.05

0.00

0.25

0.50

0.10

0.25

0.15

0.15

0.50

0.15

0.10

0.00

0.45

0.10

0.40

0.70

Liberal Avoid

0.12

0.06

0.06

0.00

0.29

0.00

0.24

0.12

0.18

0.35

0.18

0.00

0.00

0.24

0.12

0.35

0.59

Conservative
Approach

0.05

0.16

0.16

0.21

0.42

0.16

0.32

0.16

0.26

0.47

0.42

0.05

0.00

0.37

0.16

0.37

0.68

Conservative
Neutral

0.11

0.00

0.11

0.22

0.67

0.00

0.39

0.17

0.22

0.61

0.44

0.11

0.06

0.39

0.17

0.39

1.00

Conservative
Avoid
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Typicality

8.98
8.85
9.00
8.79
8.55
8.62
7.91
8.04
7.30
8.57
7.45
5.62
5.62
3.89
6.70
6.00
5.87
5.40
5.45
4.55
5.47
4.04

Stimulus

automobile
truck
car
bus
taxi
jeep
ambulance
motorcycle
streetcar
van
train
trolley
bicycle
carriage
airplane
bike
boat
jet
ship
scooter
tractor
wagon

Norming Study

8.96
8.94
8.98
8.87
8.79
8.96
8.83
8.91
7.72
8.96
8.85
7.96
8.89
8.28
8.96
8.85
8.70
8.55
8.60
8.57
8.40
8.26

Familiarity

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.95
0.95
0.77
0.73
0.86
0.77
0.73
0.73
0.64
0.68
0.86
0.73

Liberal
Approach

1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.81
0.76
0.33
0.95
0.62
0.71
0.81
0.71
0.38
0.90
0.33

Liberal
Neutral

Categorization Study

Table F9.
Typicality, Familiarity and “In-The-Category” Judgments for Vehicles

1.00
1.00
0.95
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.95
1.00
0.95
1.00
0.85
0.80
0.60
0.65
0.65
0.60
0.55
0.65
0.65
0.45
0.80
0.40

Liberal Avoid

1.00
0.94
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.94
1.00
0.94
1.00
0.94
0.76
0.71
0.53
0.76
0.53
0.71
0.82
0.71
0.53
0.76
0.35

Conservative
Approach

1.00
0.89
1.00
1.00
0.95
0.95
0.95
1.00
0.95
0.95
0.79
0.79
0.68
0.58
0.74
0.63
0.68
0.63
0.58
0.42
0.79
0.47

Conservative
Neutral

1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
1.00
0.94
0.94
1.00
0.83
1.00
0.78
0.50
0.78
0.67
0.67
0.72
0.78
0.67
0.94
0.50

Conservative
Avoid
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Typicality

6.51
5.72
3.40
3.30
4.77
4.53
4.70
4.15
2.94
3.53
3.72
3.62
3.81
2.45
3.38
2.91
3.26
2.72
2.47
3.28
2.34

Stimulus

subway
trailer
cart
wheelchair
yacht
tank
go-cart
rowboat
dogsled
tricycle
canoe
raft
submarine
sled
horse
rocket
blimp
skates
camel
feet
skis

Norming Study

Table F9 continued

8.77
8.51
8.09
8.66
7.85
8.06
8.02
8.23
7.60
8.51
8.53
7.94
7.98
8.68
8.62
8.06
7.21
8.68
7.89
8.81
8.47

Familiarity

0.91
0.73
0.45
0.50
0.68
0.73
0.77
0.50
0.55
0.68
0.36
0.32
0.73
0.41
0.45
0.73
0.55
0.36
0.32
0.18
0.32

Liberal
Approach

0.86
0.62
0.33
0.29
0.67
0.67
0.67
0.38
0.33
0.62
0.38
0.29
0.76
0.29
0.19
0.48
0.38
0.24
0.14
0.05
0.29

Liberal
Neutral

Categorization Study

0.80
0.55
0.30
0.25
0.60
0.65
0.55
0.40
0.30
0.45
0.25
0.25
0.60
0.15
0.25
0.45
0.45
0.10
0.20
0.10
0.05

Liberal Avoid

0.82
0.76
0.35
0.29
0.65
0.88
0.76
0.29
0.18
0.53
0.24
0.18
0.59
0.24
0.12
0.41
0.41
0.06
0.06
0.06
0.18

Conservative
Approach

0.89
0.63
0.47
0.26
0.58
0.68
0.79
0.47
0.32
0.42
0.37
0.32
0.58
0.26
0.16
0.53
0.47
0.16
0.16
0.11
0.16

Conservative
Neutral

0.72
0.61
0.50
0.56
0.72
0.83
0.83
0.39
0.33
0.56
0.39
0.22
0.72
0.17
0.22
0.44
0.67
0.33
0.11
0.11
0.11

Conservative
Avoid
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Typicality

3.21
2.19
2.47
2.72

Stimulus

skateboard
wheelbarrow
surfboard
elevator

Norming Study

Table F9 continued

8.30
8.26
8.13
8.83

Familiarity

0.41
0.27
0.18
0.32

Liberal
Approach

0.19
0.14
0.10
0.19

Liberal
Neutral

Categorization Study

0.15
0.20
0.00
0.20

Liberal Avoid

0.24
0.18
0.12
0.18

Conservative
Approach

0.32
0.00
0.05
0.16

Conservative
Neutral

0.28
0.33
0.06
0.22

Conservative
Avoid

Table F10.
Best Fitting Parameters and WSSD Values for Furniture
Constrained
c
Liberals
Conservatives
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Others
w
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Liberals
Approach
Others
A
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Others
B
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Others

c
52.58
44.94
38.31
58.91
57.10
53.33
61.59
54.71
48.95
48.25
51.63
44.44

wrange
0.56

A
1.03

B
1.76

α
44.58

k
13.09

µ
2.04

WSSD
50.93

0.48

1.40

2.71

0.78

144.4

437.40

49.98

0.77

1.02

1.77

25.95

22.13

12.77

54.73

0.79

1.00

1.63

133.19

4.98

3.18

48.95

0.75

1.00

1.74

39.68

15.10

5.53

53.18

1.01

1.76

256.63

2.33

7.12

48.50

1.08

1.85

31.65

17.09

2.25

52.15

1.03

1.83

108.80

5.11

16.11

49.07

1.03

1.77

65.79

8.91

3.62

51.78

1.03

1.77

65.79

8.91

3.62

51.78

1.86

8.09

59.46

91.84

53.95

1.84

2.76

154.62

61.95

50.49

1.73

39.56

15.19

7.41

48.35

1.71

40.78

14.84

15.12

51.10

98.21

6.96

0.58

52.61

6.12

87.82

-22.83

52.75

204.15

3.26

3.88

54.76

96.12

5.69

6.02

51.89

0.78
0.70
0.84
0.50
0.52
0.76

50.88

0.58

50.88

0.58
0.65

1.08
1.07
1.03
1.04

44.21

0.74

44.28

0.62

51.17

0.67

53.87

0.62

73.63

0.90

0.94

53.76

0.56

1.08

55.66

0.67

0.96

42.65

0.65

1.05

0.94
1.04
0.93
1.02

1.54
1.64
1.80
1.75
1.54
1.67
1.79
1.89
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Table F10 continued.

A&B
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Others

c

wrange

55.54

0.72

64.70

0.74

39.05

0.65

49.05

0.59

A

B

0.99
1.03
0.96
0.97

1.79
1.77
1.68
1.62

1.05

1.89

1.13

1.97

0.91

1.90

1.07

1.72

129

α

k

µ

WSSD

101.27

6.38

2.23

51.81

137.66

4.30

0.39

48.56

3.09

131.82

78.74

49.52

29.99

19.48

-0.07

110.50

Table F11.
Best Fitting Parameters and WSSD Values for Vehicles

Constrained
c
Liberals
Conservatives
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Others
w
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Others
A
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Others
B
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Others

c
3.75
2.18
2.11
3.63
3.81
3.68
3.34
2.95
2.75
3.49
3.64
2.80
3.15

wrange
0.43

A
28.59

B
38.10

α
1.82

k
0.56

µ
-24.50

WSSD
658.45

0.52

56.12

45.43

4.63

0.09

2.36

579.98

0.49

23.96

32.83

1.98

0.70

2.24

490.49

0.50

28.13

33.16

6.72

0.17

1.63

548.00

0.54

34.97

36.17

2.47

0.35

-2.15

397.11

23.80

28.94

5.72

0.28

-14.51

547.67

23.92

28.18

15.58

0.10

-3.52

459.08

38.30

39.90

8.93

0.81

2.88

574.15

26.48

31.16

3.31

0.40

-7.30

544.40

33.79

3.65

0.24

101.04

505.58

57.31

7.49

0.01

416.96

734.00

34.00

21.39

0.05

-5.79

512.16

29.56

0.66

2.20

-5.45

549.09

8.12

0.27

-9.62

472.20

34.74

0.06

-20.81

468.76

14.48

0.11

-5.35

404.35

2.25

0.52

-9.83

440.99

0.54
0.52
0.53
0.50
0.41
0.54
0.55
0.51

31.94
31.30
170.86
153.72

3.20

0.49

1.52

0.54

3.77

0.40

3.55

0.52

5.01

0.41

20.36

4.46

0.49

19.61

4.12

0.44

23.20

3.23

0.51

27.94

28.79
32.66
22.65
25.19

25.31
24.42
28.95
25.27
27.44
31.57
34.78
32.71
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Table F11 continued.

A&B
Liberal
Conservative
Approach
Avoidance
Conservative
Avoidance
Others
Liberals
Approach
Others

c

wrange

4.10

0.44

3.69

0.49

3.99

0.49

3.77

0.48

A

B

21.44
23.09
22.45
23.29

32.05
29.51
39.22
32.77

20.12

28.06

22.85

28.04

23.43

34.96

26.04

31.20
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α

k

µ

WSSD

2.35

0.68

-12.27

363.17

4.67

0.29

-1.50

396.18

3.30

0.54

-2.62

381.26

4.68

0.29

-2.05

463.80
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